Explaining the rise of diaspora institutions

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Explaining the rise of diaspora institutions

Alan Gamlen, Michael E. Cummings and Paul M. Vaaler

Origin-state institutions dedicated to emigrants and their descendants have been largely unnoticed by mainstream political studies even though diaspora institutions are now found in over half the countries of the world. In response, we first develop alternative theories explaining diaspora institution emergence. They emerge to: ‘tap’ diasporas for resources vital to origin-state development and security; ‘embrace’ diasporas to help define origin-state political identity and achieve domestic political goals; or ‘govern’ diasporas in ways that demonstrate origin-state adherence to global norms. Second, we investigate empirical support for these tapping, embracing and governing explanations in regression and related analyses of diaspora institution emergence in 113 origin states observed from 1992 to 2012. Findings suggest support for all three perspectives with more robust evidentiary support for governing. Our analyses suggest several directions for future research on how and why diaspora institutions emerge for different origin-state purposes.

1. Introduction

Migration research to date has focused more on *immigration* policies made by migrants’ destination states than *emigration* policies made by migrants’ states of birth or ancestral origin, which we call in this study ‘origin states’. That imbalance merits adjustment given recent changes in official attitudes toward emigrants and their descendants in the ‘diaspora’.1

In origin states around the world, diaspora members once disdained as victims, deserters or traitors are now more likely to be feted as national heroes in events such as diaspora congresses, and in holidays to celebrate their contributions to the ‘homeland’ (Shain and Barth 2003; Durand 2004). Emigrants and their descendants are courted in campaigns to encourage financial remittances, investments, donations and ‘roots tourism’ (Brinkerhoff 2008; Abramson 2019; Mahieu 2019). They are granted new categories of extra-territorial citizenship and voting rights, sometimes with dedicated representatives in origin-state legislatures (Barry 2006; Lafleur 2011; Collyer 2014). These and other policy initiatives to promote solidarity with, concern for, and accountability to diasporas are becoming...
an increasingly visible element of the political landscape, not only in migrants’ states of origin but also in international affairs (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Collyer 2013).

To support and coordinate these initiatives, a growing number of origin states have established diaspora institutions, which we define as formal state offices in executive or legislative branches of government dedicated to the affairs of emigrants and their descendants (Agunias and Newland 2012; Gamlen 2014a). By 2012, some 27 states had established fully fledged government ministries for their respective diasporas, usually as part of an exclusive ministerial portfolio but sometimes as part of a shared executive office. Examples include Serbia’s Ministry of Diaspora, which was founded in 1991 and merged with the Ministry of Religion in 2003. Armenia and Dominica both established diaspora ministries in 2008, and Somalia founded a Ministry for Diaspora and Investment in 2009.

More common still are diaspora-focused administrative departments, directorates and units within the executive branch of government. Such offices have emerged in some 40% of all United Nations (UN) Member States. Examples (with years of establishment) include: Albania’s National Diaspora Institute (1996); Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Department of Diaspora (2006); Ethiopia’s Diaspora Coordinating Office (2011); Haiti’s Diaspora Affairs Office (1986); the Indonesian Diaspora Desk (2013); Latvia’s Diaspora Programme (2004); Poland’s Diaspora Affairs Unit (2009) and Zambia’s Diaspora Liaison Office (2010). Similarly, units for ‘Regional Integration and Diaspora’ have emerged in several Caribbean states. Typically such institutions sit within foreign ministries or labour ministries, though some origin states have established inter-departmental committees representing several ministries whose work touches on diaspora issues. One example is the Inter-ministerial Committee for Chilean Communities Abroad established in 2009.

Diaspora institutions are also found in the legislative branches of origin states as standing committees, such as Nigeria’s House Committee on Diaspora Affairs, or as dedicated seats in the national parliament such as in Angola, Cape Verde, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Italy, Macedonia, Morocco, Mozambique, Portugal, Romania and Tunisia. In some cases diaspora institutions comprise formal advisory councils tasked with reviewing aspects of legislation affecting diaspora groups. One example is the Hungarian Diaspora Council.

With these examples in mind, we follow previous research defining diaspora institutions broadly as ‘formal state offices dedicated to emigrants and their descendants’ (Gamlen 2014a, 182). We adhere strictly to the specifics of this definition when analysing diaspora institutions and their emergence empirically in this study, so as to ensure both reliability and validity of our measures. We exclude non-governmental and quasi-governmental organisations that receive state funding or act in pseudo-governmental roles (Brinkerhoff 2019). We exclude policies (e.g. overseas tax assessments or voting rights) that have diasporic effects but no separate formal bureaucratic existence (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2019). We exclude political parties (which occupy but do not constitute formal state offices), local-level government institutions (often limited in scope and lifespan) and institutions within the judiciary or military (which operate quite differently from other civil service institutions). We include only formally named, funded and staffed offices housed within the legislative and executive branches of national governments.
We have seen prodigious growth in the number of diaspora institutions since the 1990s. Figure 1 graphically illustrates that growth. The last 25 years have seen their emergence in more than half of all UN member states. They are a central component of policy prescriptions from prominent migration-focused international organisations and think tanks (Agunias and Newland 2012). Diaspora institutions are not entirely new. Many recent institutions, including those in Mexico, Poland and Italy, are the latest incarnations of emigration and diaspora policies stretching back through the twentieth century and beyond (Smith 2003b; Délano 2011). But it is only more recently that diaspora institutions have spread globally, and have played a more central role in origin-state political and economic development.

Despite their recent growth and growing importance, diaspora institutions have been largely overlooked by mainstream research in political science and related academic research domains. To the extent that diaspora engagement policies have attracted research attention, it has been largely limited to individual country case studies offering little comparative insight and lacking the broader generalisability that cross-country statistical analyses might permit (Gamlen et al. 2013; Ragazzi 2014). The recency of diaspora institutional emergence on a global scale helps to explain this research gap. But we also think the disciplinary location of the topic matters. Diaspora studies lie in a grey zone between domestic politics and international relations, which are the preserve of separate political science sub-disciplines. We think diaspora institutions merit closer research attention in substantial part because they blur disciplinary lines between domestic and international research domains (Varadarajan 2010). Diaspora institutions extend domestic politics beyond national borders, extraterritorially projecting state power to shape the identity

Figure 1. Percentage of United Nations Member States with diaspora institutions, by institution type, 1980-2014.
of emigrants and their descendants. Diaspora institutions also spatially reconfigure states so that they no longer fit a territorially discrete ‘modernist geopolitical’ model of political organisation (Gamlen 2008). Diaspora institutions help modify the perception of emigrants and their descendants into a category of belonging defined by, rather than in opposition to, the origin state (Ragazzi 2009). In these and other ways, diaspora institutions are transforming relationships among power, place and identity central to the study of politics (Délano Alonso and Mylonas 2019).

Our study provides an initial guide for studying the emergence of diaspora institutions. Drawing on previous work (Gamlen et al. 2013; Gamlen 2014a), we begin by outlining three prominent theoretical perspectives on the emergence of diaspora institutions, grounded existing interdisciplinary theoretical and case study literature and in in-depth qualitative research over a 10-year period covering some 60 states and a range of international organisations. One widespread perspective in existing case study literature focuses on origin-state interests in ‘tapping’ the resources of emigrants and their descendants. Another widely found perspective highlights constitutive ideas of citizenship and statehood that shape origin states interests in ‘embracing’ their diasporas no matter how wealthy or influential emigrants and their descendants may be. We also offer a third ‘governing’ perspective, which highlights the role of evolving global norms in the general area of migration governance (Betts 2011), and more specifically around ‘diaspora governance’ (Gamlen 2014a; 2014c). Our central aims are to articulate these three perspectives and then investigate empirical support for each perspective using broad-sample, cross-country statistical analyses called for in previous research (Délano and Gamlen 2014; Gamlen 2014a; Ragazzi 2014).

Tapping, embracing and governing perspectives imply certain empirical relationships explaining diaspora institution emergence. We investigate support for those empirical relationships with an original data set of diaspora institutions and determinants for 113 states observed from 1992 to 2012. Regression and related analyses yield several insights. First, we find that over two decades diaspora institutions rose from a curiosity found in a few exceptional origin states, to a standard component of state bureaucracy found in well over half of all UN members. Second, we find that many measurable factors related to tapping, embracing and governing perspectives explain significant variation in the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence in an origin state. Third and perhaps most interestingly, we find that measures related to the more recently developed governing perspective exhibit more robust explanatory support for diaspora institution emergence than measures related to tapping and embracing. Governing merits more attention as a perspective explaining diaspora institution emergence and development.

Our study advances migration studies research, practice and policy-making in several ways. For researchers we identify, distinguish theoretically, and document broad-sample, cross-country statistical evidence related to prominent theoretical perspectives explaining why origin states establish diaspora institutions. We develop data, sampling and estimation methods for researchers to follow in translating diaspora institutional concepts and constructs into measurable factors and estimable models for validating empirical investigation. These advances also matter for practice and policy assessment. Origin-state ministers and officials, representatives from emigrant groups, consultants and others can use our perspectives to guide discussions about the purpose of a particular diaspora engagement policy and its fit with a particular type of diaspora institution. They can
use our evidence to explain the recent emergence of such institutions in neighbouring origin states and infer the near-term likelihood of their emergence elsewhere. International organisations can use our perspectives and methods to monitor with better precision the recent world-wide growth and near-term trajectory of diaspora institutions. In these ways and others, we illuminate pathways for future work in this grey area between domestic and international politics.

2. Alternative perspectives on diaspora institution emergence

Why are so many states establishing diaspora institutions? In this section, we offer brief answers grounded in existing literature on diaspora institutions. We label these three perspectives as tapping, embracing and governing. Their development follows from analysis of political theory and case study evidence. Our summary of these three perspectives anticipates empirical study called for in previous research. We then translate prominent factors associated with each perspective into measurable proxies ready for inclusion in broad-sample, cross-country statistical analyses.

2.1. Tapping perspective

A tapping perspective is grounded in what international relations scholars often call rationalism and neostructuralism. Rationalism synthesises neorealist and neoliberal approaches, which as Smith notes, disagree about how much institutions constrain ‘international anarchy’ and whether states seek ‘absolute or relative gains’, but both assume states are unitary actors driven by material strategies (Smith 2000, 381).

The rationalist version of the tapping perspective for explaining the emergence of diaspora institutions starts from an assumption that origin states are primarily interested in exploiting diaspora resources to pursue national interests. Much of the scholarship on diasporas in international relations, for example, emphasises traditional neorealist priorities such as diplomacy and conflict. By the mid-1990s, many origin states had established or were seeking to establish new ethnic lobbying groups in Washington to support their diplomatic efforts at influencing US foreign policy (Shain 1995). Traditionally such efforts have been discreet. As the Director of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad described his country’s diaspora engagement efforts in the 1990s:

The L word was forbidden in our vocabulary, the lobby word. [Officially] we were not lobbying anything; we were not mobilizing anything . . . . [But] we distribute information. We organize meetings. We make sure that leaders know about positions. We build skills and capacities openly. We put [Mexicans in the USA] in contact with Democrats and Republicans over there. We help them raise funds in order to strengthen their institutional capabilities, we sponsor many of those political organizations, or rather organizations that have a political agenda. Not a partisan agenda, we don’t bet for Democrats or Republicans. But we strengthen [migrant organizations’] leadership capabilities even in the political arena. (Gonzalez-Gutierrez 2007)

Today some diaspora institutions cultivate ethnic lobbies openly. The State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad, for example, explicitly aims to develop a Bulgarian international lobby (Agency for Bulgarians Abroad 2013). Diaspora institutions may complement (not substitute for) other formal diplomatic efforts: informal diaspora-led initiatives
may become more emphatic as the origin state’s network of formal ties abroad becomes more extensive. Today Mexico’s diaspora engagement efforts, for example, rely on the country’s 50+ consulates in the USA.

Also in line with neorealist emphases on conflict, origin states may form diaspora institutions to deal with the problem of ‘refugee warriors’ seeking to overturn the homeland regime. Diaspora institutions may help origin states to run interference with such hostile emigrants, while cultivating friendly ones as informal ambassadors, who can bring foreign resources and influence to bear at important moments back home – including during post-conflict reconstruction processes (Shain and Barth 2003; Betts and Jones 2016). In one real-world example, a senior official responsible for diaspora issues in Afghanistan explained that,

\[\text{[by the end of 2014, there were talks about [the] leaving [of] foreign forces from the country and by that we forecast reduction in foreign aid. So we have to look into different areas in order to compensate that lack of investments, and we thought diaspora is one of the sources that can, to some extent, compensate this gap. (Niru 2013)\]

This neorealist-type formulation of the tapping perspective, along with related case study evidence, suggests a testable hypothesis: diaspora institution emergence is more likely in the wake of an origin state’s involvement in violent conflict – say, with higher counts of battle-related deaths.

A neoliberal version of the tapping perspective focuses on states’ rational pursuit of national interests, but prioritises economic issues over security and diplomatic concerns. In this view, better-managed emigration, facilitated by diaspora institutions, may cultivate ‘triple wins’ for migrants, origin states and destination states. Such accounts are partly inspired by a ‘new migration and development optimism’ (Gamlen 2010; 2014b). Origin-state diaspora institutions may emerge to help organise and obligate diaspora groups to remit, invest, donate and travel to the origin country, or share their development-friendly expertise from afar (Kuznetsov 2006; Merz, Chen, and Geithner 2007; Brinkerhoff 2008; Vaaler 2011; Martinez, Cummings, and Vaaler 2015). Origin states may hope to use diaspora resource contributions to offset the emigrant ‘brain drain’ (Meyer 2001). Although origin states avoid the word, such diaspora institutions and policies may help collect an expatriate ‘tax’ (Bhagwati 1976).

In contrast to rationalism, neostructuralism is concerned with how a state’s action is shaped by its position in an asymmetrical global economic system (Gills and Palan 1994). Neostructuralists also focus on economic factors, but their prognosis is more pessimistic. They treat migration as a zero-sum competition between developing origin states and developed destination states for the best workers, which leaves migrants prone to exploitation. Diaspora institutions are part of the doomed efforts of less-developed origin states to catch up with developed destination states in the industrialised world (e.g. Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994; Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Larner 2007; Varadarajan 2010; Gamlen 2013). In this view, origin-state diaspora policies, including policies promoting the emergence of diaspora institutions, express rather than mitigate the weakness and dependence of origin states.

These economically focused formulations of the tapping perspective find preliminary support in the stated aims of numerous diaspora institutions. For example, the Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad (MHAVE 2012) says it aims to facilitate diaspora investment
and philanthropy. The Institute of Angolan Communities Abroad and Consular Services (2014, 1) seeks to ‘encourage overseas communities to invest in Angola, including support visits and business trips’. From 2003 to 2009, Ghana maintained a Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations providing tourist packages aiming to position the country as a gateway to the continent for African Diaspora visitors (Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations 2014). Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Department of Diaspora claims it wants to harness diaspora knowledge and skills by creating a register of highly skilled Bosnian experts living abroad (Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011).

The economic formulation of the tapping perspective, with its neoliberal and neostructural overtones and broad range of supporting case study evidence, suggests a second hypothesis for empirical study. Diaspora institution emergence is less likely with greater origin-state wealth – for example, higher GDP per capita in the origin state – because wealthier origin states have fewer perceived needs to ‘tap’ their diasporas for economic gain.

2.2. Embracing perspective

Notwithstanding their different theoretical nuances – rationalist, neorealist, neoliberal and neostructural – these versions of the tapping perspective all tend to represent origin states as territorially sealed individual actors with bounded identities. This ‘methodologically nationalistic’ view attracts criticism for treating origin states as naturally occurring units of sociological analysis (Wimmer and Schiller 2002). Focusing solely on economic and political interests behind diaspora institutions also attracts criticism: it focuses only on material motivations for these institutions and ignores ‘ideational’ motivations. An alternative perspective focuses more on the ideas and identities that constitute origin states and shape their behaviour (Checkel 1998). This phenomenological/social-constructivist insight informs what we call an embracing perspective, which explains the emergence of diaspora institutions as expressions of extra-territorial or transnational citizenship. In this explanation, origin states engage diasporas in efforts represent political communities comprising more than just populations within their borders (Fitzgerald 2006; Bauböck 2009).

Studies which take this approach typically depict origin states embracing an ethnic nation dispersed across multiple state territories. For example, Somalia’s Office for Diaspora Affairs (2014) coordinates a variety of government programmes to enhance diaspora participation in nation-building activities. Serbia’s Office for Cooperation with the Diaspora and Serbs in the Region (2014) aims to assist the preservation and development of the spiritual, national and cultural identity of the Serbian people outside the Republic of Serbia (see Mylonas 2012). In such cases, diaspora institutions may be an expression of long-distance, trans-sovereign nationalism (Csergo and Goldgeier 2004). There are cases (including Germany and Korea) where origin states have reached out to legally and politically – not ethnically – defined diasporas (Brubaker and Kim 2011). However, most literature associates long-distance nationalism with the ‘re-ethnicizing’ of citizenship by right-wing nationalist politicians in the origin state (Joppke 2005). Frequently cited cases include Hungary’s Status Laws, rejected as ethno-nationalist antagonism by neighbouring Balkan states (Ieda 2004).
This version of the embracing perspective, therefore, suggests a hypothesis for empirical analysis: origin states with governments holding more right-wing, nationalist orientations are more likely to create diaspora institutions. The World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions provides government partisan orientation information to use as categorical measures to correlate with origin-state diaspora institution emergence.

As discussed above, diaspora institutions may help governments to spy on dissidents in the diaspora, and in some cases this has been shown to directly support authoritarian regimes (Brand 2002; 2006). But diaspora institutions may also emerge nominally to serve democratisation efforts, helping emigrants and their descendants to participate politically in the origin state, whether directly through expatriate voting provisions, or indirectly through the influence of the diaspora on domestic voters (Smith 2003a; Paarlberg 2019). For example, Serbia’s diaspora institution aims to ‘support and improve the exercise of voting rights’ among external citizens (Office for Cooperation with the Diaspora and Serbs in the Region 2014, 1). Often, diaspora institutions deliberately promote the welfare of emigrants and their descendants through targeted health and educational programmes (Délano 2011). And in many cases, diaspora institutions express the will of newly democratic governments to welcome back exiles of the previous regime (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010). As Ethiopia’s UN ambassador put it:

Ethiopia has started a journey of democratisation in 1991 …. before that, during the 17 years of that military dictatorship, Ethiopians fled the country because of persecution of their political views …. They have remained active during the struggle to overthrow the military regime …. they have, I think, participated during the transition period, in terms of formulating what kind of constitution Ethiopia would have post the dictatorship, but they have been also active in different ways since the Federal Government has been established. So this policy seeks to lay the ground, to consolidate the different aspects of this participation and assist our diaspora, facilitate our conditions for our diaspora to contribute constructively to building institutions in Ethiopia for democracy. (Getahun 2013)

Another hypothesis suggested by the embracing perspective and related case study evidence, therefore, is that diaspora institutions are more likely to emerge with more democratic origin states. Origin-state democracy might be measured with a Polity IV score.

2.3. Governing perspective

Both tapping and embracing perspectives tend to focus on the internal, domestic-level interests and identities that drive origin states to engage their diasporas through formal institutions. Yet, these two perspectives underplay the role of external socio-cultural and political influences in ‘world society’ (Meyer et al. 1997). Tapping and embracing perspectives help to explain the emergence of individual institutions or account for institutional differences among origin states. Yet, they may hinder explanation of convergence among origin states on strikingly similar models and best practices in this area. To counter such ‘microphenomenological’ studies of how domestic politics shape state action, scholars of policy diffusion and mobility have advocated attention to ‘macrophenomenological’ forces that shape state identities and interests and often lead to policy convergence (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Meyer 2010).

In keeping with this approach, we introduce a third ‘governing’ perspective, which focuses on the influence of international organisations and ‘first mover’ states promoting
decentralised forms of global migration governance. From a governing perspective, diaspora institutions further an ongoing international quest for a coherent system of global governance in the area of migration. They not only allow origin states to share responsibility for managing migrants with destination states, they do so without the need for some centralised agency akin to the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization. This is desireable because, although a world migration organisation has been proposed in the past, the idea has been resisted by states fearing incursions on their border sovereignty (GCIM 2005).

Instead, the UN and other international organisations have promoted more decentralised, state-led approaches to international cooperation in the area of migration, based on enlightened self-interest. If origin states, destination states and migrants could be persuaded of a way to simultaneously win from migration, they would be pre-disposed to cooperate of their own accord (Gamlen 2011; Gamlen and Marsh 2011). In the 2000s, then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and his advisors sought to strengthen this case for cooperation by fostering informal dialogue over migration in the less contentious issue area of international development. They hoped that such dialogue would eventually expand into more contentious issues related to international security (Annan 2006; Gamlen 2014a). Annan sponsored the creation of several major initiatives in this direction, including the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development and the Global Forum on Migration and Development.

The issue at stake in these dialogues was how to convert migration from a win–lose international transaction into a win–win exchange. Through their dialogues, states needed to find ways of ‘sharing responsibility’ for the various burdens and benefits of migration. One idea was for origin states to assist from afar in the management of ‘their’ migrants, instead of leaving everything to destination states. Such an approach had precedents: first mover origin states like Mexico, the Philippines and India were already ‘engaging the diaspora’ through dedicated origin-state institutions. Their experiences became favourite topics among international policy wonks, who began promoting such policies as best practices. In his address to the 2006 High Level Dialogue of the UN General Assembly on International Migration and Development, Annan (2006, 964–965) remarked that:

> Clearly, there is no consensus on making international migration the subject of formal, norm-setting negotiations. There is little appetite for any norm-setting intergovernmental commission on migration. But, as I understand the thinking of the countries that back it, the [Global Forum on Migration and Development] would be the opposite of that. It would be informal, voluntary, consultative. Above all, it would not make binding decisions. / The forum would allow us to build relationships of trust, and to bring together the best ideas that different countries have developed: facilitating remittances; engaging diasporas exploring new ways to reduce poverty; building educational partnerships; and so on [emphasis added].

The UN’s endorsement of ‘engaging diasporas’ echoed – and was re-echoed by – several other key international organisations, including the UN Development Programme, the Migration and Remittances Program at the World Bank and (perhaps most importantly) the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The recommendations of these international organisations made tangible impacts on many states’ subsequent diaspora engagement efforts. For example, Togo’s UN
ambassador noted that, ‘we had begun a certain number of programmes to work out a national policy on development and we believe that we are in synch with IOM. Our focus is on mobilisation, creation of favourable conditions for the diaspora... The diaspora programme which began in 2010 aims to tap the skills of the diaspora’. Georgia’s Minister of State explained to us that ‘IOM has served as one of the best protectors and advisers to Georgian emigrants... It has greatly contributed to designing diaspora policy’ (Surguladze 2014). A senior Afghan official explained that his interest in tapping the diaspora arose from an understanding of Afghan national interests that was formed not just from domestic influences, but from the coaching of international organisations: ‘IOM is very much interested in that. I learned that from our meetings with different colleagues from IOM’ (Niru 2013; cf. Gamlen 2014a, 201). In part because of its increasing thought-leadership role in these and other global migration governance efforts, the IOM has recently been recognised by the UN as a ‘Related Organization’ with ‘a global leading role in the field of migration’ (United Nations General Assembly 2016).

This perspective and related case study evidence suggests a hypothesis about the direct effects of governing. Diaspora institutions are more likely to emerge in origin states engaging with more global actors. One measure of engagement with global actors is membership in their organisations. More origin-state memberships in migration-focused international organisations should be positively correlated with the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence.

The global migration governance agenda may also have had indirect effects on diaspora institution emergence. Diaspora institution ‘models’ and ‘best practices’ may also have spread through shared benchmarking processes where different institutions observe, imitate and learn from each other recursively. Such processes are consistent with theories of ‘policy mobility’ and ‘policy diffusion’ in political geography and political sociology literatures (Peck 2011; Délano 2014). They are also consistent with case study evidence. For example, Ethiopia’s UN ambassador described travelling to the Philippines, India and other states, to ‘benchmark’ and ‘adapt’ the ‘best in character of engagement, best overall in institutional set up’ (Getahun 2013). A Philippines cabinet minister reported ‘looking at best practices of other countries, India, Israel and of course, Ireland’ (Nicolas 2011). Conversely, the Director of the Irish Abroad Unit reported studying ‘what Israel are doing, what India are doing, what Mexico are doing and ... sharing and collaboration to develop best practice’ (Madden 2014). A crucial former Indian Ambassador explained how the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs was influenced by the way ‘the Jewish community had mobilised support for Israel’ (Sharma 2013). Meanwhile the Director of Israel’s Joint Distribution Committee explained being ‘taken by the examples of Mexico and the Philippines’. The Director of Mexico’s diaspora institution cited Israel as one of its inspirations (Mantver 2013). An important part of the governing perspective, therefore, is to observe how the diffusion of diaspora institutions and related practices have become iterative processes of co-creation and adaptation (Iskander 2010), with policies mutating as they pass back and forth through geographically and culturally linked networks of states and international organisations.

This theoretical perspective and related case study evidence suggests a final ‘governing’ hypotheses for empirical study. Origin states observe the emergence of policies in ‘first mover’ peer states, which creates a mimetic motivation to establish similar institutions, separately from any influence from international migration organisations. One measure
of that indirect mimetic motivation is the number of neighbouring states with diaspora institutions.

3. Empirically analysing diaspora institution emergence

In the foregoing section, we identified three prominent perspectives: tapping, embracing and governing. We elaborated on their respective grounding in relevant theories of state action and in relevant case study evidence. In this section, we connect those perspectives to measurable indicators amenable to broad-sample, cross-country statistical analysis and hypothesis testing. Tapping perspective indicators of diaspora institution emergence relate to origin-state economic development, diplomacy and security. Origin-state wealth negatively relates and battle-related deaths suffered by the origin state positively relate to diaspora institutional emergence. Embracing perspective indicators relate to origin-state political identity and authority. Origin-state democracy and incumbent government right-wing partisan orientation both positively relate to diaspora institution emergence. Governing perspective indicators relate to origin-state tendencies to adhere to broader global standards of diaspora treatment. Greater prevalence of diaspora institutions in neighbouring states and origin-state level of involvement in migration-related organisations both positively relate to diaspora institution emergence. We next elaborate on such indicators and how they may be incorporated into empirical models explaining variation in diaspora institution emergence.

3.1. Model terms and measures

To test these hypotheses, we first define a general purpose empirical model explaining diaspora institution emergence as a function of tapping, embracing and governing perspective terms:

\[ DI_{ijt} = \alpha + \sum_{m=1}^{q} \beta_{m}\text{p}

\text{erspectives}_{ijt} + \sum_{c=1}^{3} \lambda_{c}\text{common}_{ijt} + \epsilon_{ijt}, \tag{1} \]

In (1), the dependent variable, \( DI \) is a 0–1 term representing diaspora institution emergence taking the value of 0 if there is no diaspora institution in origin state \( i \) within geographic region \( j \) during year \( t \); and 1 if there is at least one institution. One set of terms in (1), \( \text{Common} \), is included in all \( DI \) estimations. They are defined in Table 1. We describe them here in brief and include their expected impact on \( DI \) in parentheses. \( \text{Common} \) includes three terms varying by origin state \( i \) and lagged by one year, \( t - 1 \): Population Density (+), Diaspora Size (+) and Diaspora Density (–). Previous literature highlights incentives for small and often densely populated island states in the Pacific and the Caribbean to engage their diasporas no matter the policy motivation (Laguerre 1998; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2002; Bertram 2006). We also control for diaspora size, as a larger constituency is more likely to prompt emergence of a diaspora institution, again no matter its primary policy motivation. Lastly, the need for institutional coordination of diaspora engagement policies, and with it the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence, may decrease with greater diaspora density (i.e. geographical concentration) irrespective of the policy motivation.
Table 1. Variables, expected signs and data sources for analyses of diaspora institution emergence, 1992–2012.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical perspectives and assumptions</th>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Variable description (for origin state (i) in year (t - 1))</th>
<th>(Di) affect</th>
<th>Raw (Non-standardised) descriptive statistics</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DV</strong></td>
<td>Diaspora Institution Emergence (Di)</td>
<td>0–1 dummy indicating whether origin state has some diaspora institution</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Authors’ estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common control variables</strong></td>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>Origin-state population/area (km(^2))</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Mean: 83.32 St Dev: 122.47</td>
<td>WDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diaspora size</td>
<td>Size of diaspora (% of population)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Mean: 6.41 St Dev: 7.38</td>
<td>GBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diaspora density</td>
<td>Herfindahl index of diaspora location across destination states (higher values indicate diaspora members located in fewer destination states)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Mean: 0.33 St Dev: 0.20</td>
<td>GBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tapping perspective</strong></td>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>Origin-state per-capita GDP (US$, thousands)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Mean: 7.88 St Dev: 13.24</td>
<td>WDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battle-related deaths</td>
<td>Count of deaths resulting from battle</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Mean: 0.10 St Dev: 0.48</td>
<td>WDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Embracing perspective</strong></td>
<td>Right-wing executive</td>
<td>0–1 dummy indicating if origin state is led by right-wing or right-centre executive</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Mean: 0.26 St Dev: 0.44</td>
<td>Beck et. al. (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>−10 to 10 ordinal scale for origin-state political openness, calculated by subtracting autocracy score from democracy score (ordinal)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Mean: 3.60 St Dev: 6.26</td>
<td>Polity IV Project, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governing perspective</strong></td>
<td>UIA index</td>
<td>0–100 point ordinal scale related to membership in int’l migration organisations</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Mean: 5.84 St Dev: 5.97</td>
<td>UIA, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geographic proximity</td>
<td>Distance-weighted measure of neighbouring states’ diaspora institutions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Mean: 0.11 St Dev: 0.08</td>
<td>Adapted from Mayer and Zignago (2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\) WDI: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2012); GBM: Global Bilateral Migration Database (Özden et. al. 2011).
Next, we include alternative sets of terms related to each of the three perspectives. They vary by country and time, and are lagged by one year. To estimate DI effects related to tapping, we include Battle-Related Deaths (+) and Wealth (–). To estimate DI effects related to embracing, we include Right-Wing Executive (+) and Polity (+). To estimate DI effects related to governing, we include Geographic Proximity (+) and UIA Index (+). Section 2 immediately above provides general explanation for how we measure these terms. Table 1 below provides additional information on these measures, including their specific sources and references to their use in previous research.

Our overall empirical strategy is first to compare observed signs and significance of individual terms to predicted signs to understand how well tapping, embracing and governing perspectives explain diaspora emergence individually and in combination with terms from other perspectives. Second, we will compare the magnitude of each individual term to gain a holistic sense of the explanatory power provided by terms for each perspective. In order to facilitate this comparison of magnitude, we standardise all non-categorical variables ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$) and convert regression coefficients to proportional hazard ratios.

3.2. Estimation strategy, data sources and sampling

We treat DI as an irreversible event. Once established, diaspora institutions persist until the end of our observation period. Thus, we estimate DI in (1) using a Cox proportional hazard model. The Cox estimator typically explains variation in the likelihood that some ‘at risk’ individual will exhibit a ‘condition’ such as illness or death in an person, bankruptcy in a firm, or war in a state. In our context, origin states are ‘at risk’ of diaspora institution emergence (i.e. $DI = 1$). One advantage of the Cox estimator is that it treats origin states with no diaspora institution at the end of our observation period as still ‘at risk’ of getting one. It thus accounts for potential ‘right-censoring’ of origin states with no diaspora institution emergence at the end of 2013, the last year of our sample. We can interpret Cox-based regression hazard ratios to assess the sign, significance and magnitude of effects on DI. We can also use post-estimation analyses plotting the cumulative ‘hazard’ of diaspora institution emergence to gain additional illustrative insight on relationships between DI and various individual terms.

For our analyses, we initially sample from all UN member states with information on origin-state diaspora institutions starting in 1990. We then obtain data for right-hand side terms in (1) from various sources including the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (e.g. Wealth), Database of Political Institutions (e.g. Right-Wing Executive), and other data sources listed in Table 1. We eliminate origin states with diaspora institutions in 1990 and 1991 – only 12% of sampled states – and states with missing data for other key variables. Our resulting panel data set comprises 1464 origin-state-year observations for 113 origin states observed from 1992 to 2012.

4. Empirical results

4.1. Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics while Table 2 reports pairwise correlations for all terms in model specification (1). In Table 1, sample means largely comport with our
intuitions. For example, the mean (standard deviation) Diaspora Size is 6.41 (7.38) percent of the origin-state population. States with large diasporas include Guyana, where the diaspora approaches half of the origin-state population. In terms of average wealth, the mean (standard deviation) Wealth is US$7882 ($13241) in per-capita GDP. The average value for UIA index is 5.83, indicating that on average, states’ involvement corresponds to full membership in three migration-related international organisations.9

Table 2’s pairwise correlations present preliminary evidence consistent with research assumptions. Column 1’s results indicate that DI is correlated as assumed with Common terms in (1): Population Density (+), Diaspora Size (+) and Diaspora Density (−). Coefficients for all three terms are significant at commonly accepted levels of at least 10% (p < .10). Column 1 also indicates partial preliminary support for assumptions associated with different theoretical perspectives explaining diaspora institution emergence. Tapping perspective terms Wealth (−) and Battle-related Deaths (+) exhibit expected signs but not at commonly accepted statistical levels. Embracing perspective terms Polity (+) and Right-Wing Executive (+) exhibit positive signs with Polity significant, here at the 5% level. Governing perspective terms UIA Index (+) and Geographic Proximity (+) also exhibit expected signs, here at the 1% level of significance. Overall, pairwise correlations support our expectations regarding variable signs for all three perspectives, but only governing perspective terms exhibit both expected signs and significance indicative of greater power in explaining diaspora institution emergence as we move on to results from Cox regression analyses.

4.2. Regression results

Table 3 reports results from Cox regression analyses with Column 1 reporting results from estimation of (1) with Common controls only, Column 2 reporting results from estimation with both Common controls and the six additional terms related to the three theoretical perspectives, and Column 3 reporting the results from estimation of the same full model, but with a sub-sample of countries with below-average wealth. As we review these regression results, note that Cox regression estimates are marginal hazard ratios indicating the change in likelihood of attaining some at-risk condition relative to an unspecified base rate for attaining that same condition. In this context, an estimate less than one is equivalent to a negative effect – attaining the condition is slowed relative to
the base rate. Recall that in all regression analyses we standardise non-categorical terms. This approach permits us to compare effect magnitudes.

In Columns 1–3 we see that the three Common terms enter with the predicted signs and at commonly accepted significance levels in most instances. Population Density and Diaspora Size enter positively at the 5% level in Column 1 and at the 1% level in Columns 2–3 of Table 3. We can illustrate effect magnitudes based on these initial results. For example, in Column 1, holding other terms at their mean value, a one standard deviation increase in Population Density raises the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence by approximately 35.2 percentage points (1.352 – 1 = 0.352) above the base rate.

Column 2 of Table 3 adds the six perspective-related terms explaining diaspora institution emergence. Origin-state Wealth enters with the expected negative sign, is significant at the 1% level, and has a substantial effect magnitude. Holding other terms at their mean values, a standard deviation increase in Wealth reduces the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence by 61.2 percentage points (1 – 0.388 = 0.612). This is consistent with tapping assumptions that origin states lacking critical resources at home are more likely to create institutions helping them find those resources from migrants abroad.

Polity enters with the expected positive sign, is significant at the 10% level, and indicates substantial effect magnitude. Holding other terms at their mean values, a standard
deviation increase in \textit{Polity} increases by 39.4 percentage points (1.394 – 1 = 0.394) the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence. Consistent with an embracing perspective assumption, this finding also comports with a dual strategy followed by many developing countries internalising ‘Washington Consensus’ values: more open and democratic domestic and international politics. This interpretation itself hints at the role of global norms – which is the central focus of the governing perspective.

In Column 2, \textit{UIA Index} enters with the expected positive sign, is significant at the 1% level, and also has substantial effect size. Holding other terms at their mean levels, a standard deviation increase in \textit{UIA Index} increases the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence by 69.1 percentage points (1.691 – 1 = 0.691). Origin states with many memberships in international migration organisations establish diaspora institutions sooner.\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Geographic Proximity} also enters positively in Column 2, but the effect is significant only at the 12% level, so caution in interpretation is merited. A standard deviation increase in \textit{Geographic Proximity} increases by 19.8 percentage points the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence. Governing perspective assumptions find support not only when assessing origin-state adherence to international migration organisations, but also when assessing origin-state mimicry of neighbouring state policies and practices related to diaspora engagement.

Plotting the effects in Column 2 of Table 3 adds complementary insight on how different factors related to tapping, embracing and governing explain the likelihood of origin-state diaspora engagement institution emergence. \textbf{Figure 2} presents four graphs of

\begin{figure}[h]
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{cumulative_hazard_plots.png}
  \caption{Cumulative hazard plots of selected impacts on likelihood of diaspora institution emergence, 1992–2012.}
\end{figure}
diaspora institution emergence plotted against time (years) with different values of Wealth (Figure 2(a)), Polity (Figure 2(b)), UIA Index (Figure 2(c)), and Geographic Proximity (Figure 2(d)). We generate trend lines in these four graphs using Stata’s `stcurve` command after Cox regression estimation. Low, Medium and High values for each term correspond to the standardised values of −1, 0 and 1, respectively. Wealth and UIA Index exhibit larger trend-line deviations compared to Polity and Geographic Proximity, consistent with the larger effect magnitude Wealth and UIA Index indicate in regression results. These regression and related graphical analyses indicate general effects of the six perspective terms on diaspora institution emergence. They again indicate support for all three perspectives with some more substantial support for the governing perspective where both terms explain diaspora institution emergence significantly and substantially across our sampled countries.

Column 3 of Table 3 presents Cox regression results using a sub-sample of 66 origin states with below-average Wealth, that is, with per-capita incomes less than $7880. Signs on estimated coefficients are consistent with Column 2 results but with fewer estimates significant at commonly accepted levels, no doubt following from less power in estimation. We find several interesting changes in the magnitude of certain effects. For example, the UIA Index coefficient associated with the governing perspective increases from 1.691 in Column 2 to 2.100 in Column 3, significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, the coefficient on Geographic Proximity decreases from 1.198 to 1.147 and loses significance at commonly accepted levels. Both factors related to governing may matter for explaining institution emergence in origin states generally, but their magnitudes appear to vary with levels of economic development. Perhaps poorer, less-developed origin states are more responsive to comparison and compliance with international migration organisations and practices captured by the UIA Index while richer emerging origin states are more responsive to comparison and compliance with neighbouring origin-state patterns of diaspora institution emergence. Another valid interpretation of this finding would be explained by the observation that some donor organisations may encourage origin states who are aid recipients to both join international migration organisations and to formally engage their diasporas — perhaps in order to reduce their reliance on development aid. Whatever the explanation, such change in results points again to the importance of the governing perspective in different origin-state contexts.

5. Discussion

5.1. Central findings

Our study set out to explain why origin states establish institutions devoted to emigrants and their descendants. We identified three explanatory perspectives grounded in relevant political theories and case study evidence. The tapping perspective depicted instrumentally rational origin states pursuing material interests by engaging diasporas as strategic assets in conflict and diplomacy, and by harnessing their finances, networks and skills to promote ‘migration for development’. The embracing perspective portrayed value-rational origin states fortifying their constitutive identities and values by re-incorporating missing members of the nation-state. In addition to these more familiar perspectives, we offered a third perspective called governing. This view drew on institutional theories and practices,
treating diaspora institutions as models of international migration management, diffused through international pressures, expectations and advice. We know of no previous research that reviews, synthesises, develops and applies political theories to the issue of state-diaspora relations in this way.

Another aim of our study was to operationalise these perspectives so as to gain new empirical insight on determinants of diaspora institution emergence based on a broad-sample cross-country statistical analysis. Previous empirical research on diaspora engagement typically came in the form of case study narratives. While important for explaining individual instances, such qualitative methods have limited ability to explain global patterns. This undermines the development of evidence-based insight to inform political theory, practice and public policy. We responded with a broad-sample cross-country statistical analysis of factors explaining diaspora institution emergence across 113 origin states observed from 1992 to 2012. The breadth and depth of this data set was unprecedented. It drew on over a decade of interviews, participant observation and detailed documentary research with diaspora policy-makers around the world. We included new variables for study such as the *UIA Index* to measure origin-state membership and adherence to norms guiding diaspora treatment in a growing number of international migration organisations. We also explored the substantive impact of the effects by calculating and graphically illustrating their explanatory power.

The analysis yielded important results. We found support for all three perspectives, perhaps with some broader support for governing perspective factors indicating the importance of diffusing migration governance norms through international organisations and neighbouring states. Our analysis also highlighted the importance of studying such factors in context given that effect significance and magnitude changed with varying levels of origin-state economic development.

5.2. Implications for research, practice and public policy

These theoretical and empirical contributions have wider implications for migration research, practice and public policy. Development of research on diaspora institution emergence to date has largely been framed around tapping and embracing perspectives. But to understand and appreciate the recent proliferation and standardisation of such institutions, we also need to account for the diffusion of migration management ‘best practices’ through international organisations and neighbouring origin states. Doing so reveals that efforts to engage migrants and their descendants are not just rationally determined by origin-state interests and values. They are also shaped by socially determined global norms about how best to manage migration for mutually beneficial development, and how best to respect migrant human rights in destination states. Both sets of norms have developed in the absence of any centralised global migration governance framework. Future study of diaspora institution emergence should acknowledge and incorporate this newer but potentially powerful governing perspective grounded in institutional theory. In this study, we demonstrated how that governing perspective can be operationalised, integrated into a statistical study, and tested next to alternative analytical perspectives.

We see implications for diaspora engagement practice and public policy. Professionals working in international migration organisations and origin-state officials charged with overseeing diaspora initiatives abroad may look to our analytical results for clues regarding
where diaspora institutions are more likely to emerge in the near term. Simple origin-state policy initiatives touching on international organisation membership may well signal near-term institution emergence. Lower levels of wealth are another predictor of diaspora institution emergence. Other ‘clues’ could mislead international organisation workers and origin-state officials. Think, for example, of trends indicating a partisan shift in origin-state government from left- to right-wing parties, which is theoretically sound but lacks significant empirical support. Our study indicated which determinants of diaspora institution emergence merit consideration and, perhaps, greater weight in decisions leading to scarce resource allocation by diaspora management professionals and public policy officials.

6. Conclusion and future research directions

Our study set out to explain diaspora institution emergence, and then to investigate empirical support for that explanation. In doing so, we clarified and mapped out research territory in the grey zone between domestic comparative politics and international relations.

Our explanations and empirical investigations assumed not only association between certain factors and diaspora institution emergence, but also causation running from those certain factors to emergence. We took care to explain what those causal links were in theory – for example, it was the pre-existing tendency of right-wing governments to implement nationalist policies at home that would cause those same governments to create a new diaspora institution or upgrade the status of an existing institution so that it might embrace their diaspora to highlight nationalist policies at home. We defined our terms carefully, and collected data on them from well-vetted data sources – for example, defining the Right-Wing Executive term based on the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions. We lagged such terms in statistical models to provide temporal precedence. We used a Cox proportional hazard model specifically tailored to assessing diaspora institution emergence as a one-way condition all origin states are vulnerable to, but only some exhibit during our period of study.

That said, our results are still vulnerable to omitted variables and variable relationships that may run in the opposite direction from diaspora institution emergence to factors we treated as causal. Future research should address these possibilities, initially by developing theories to explain which variables are more likely to have been omitted and how reverse causation arises. Follow-on empirical study might then test for such omissions and reversals with, say, dynamic panel estimators designed for limited dependent variables related to institution emergence.

We see at least three additional directions for further research in this area. First, we advocate research to further refine the theory, data and methods we introduce here to explain how and why origin states engage their diasporas institutionally. For example, future work could ask after factors affecting the diffusion of diaspora policy models and variation in effects related to origin-state factors other than the wealth-related factor we analysed briefly in Column 3 of Table 3. Future researchers could perform that analysis across a fuller range of origin-state factors. Perhaps future researchers could also employ dyadic (origin-destination state) data, as Mylonas has in related research contexts (2013). Second, future researchers could also benefit from asking how and why diaspora
institutions of varying type and importance emerge. For example, the governing perspective may better explain the emergence of a ministerial-level diaspora institution than a legislative-related office. Future researchers might also explain diaspora institution emergence as a function of other unstated policy objectives. Third, and perhaps most importantly, future research could build on our initial guide by studying the impacts of diaspora institutions, using our measures on the right-hand side of models predicting a range of political, economic and social behaviour. Our study charts a path forward for these and other research avenues offering new directions for studying a new type of institution emerging around the world.

**Disclosure statement**

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

**Notes**

1. ‘Diaspora’ is a hotly contested term, but put simply, it refers to ‘an imagined community dispersed from a professed homeland’ (Vertovec 2009: 5). We use ‘diaspora’ more or less synonymously with ‘emigrants and their descendants’. For a detailed analysis of the term, its significance, and the field of diaspora studies, see, for example, Cohen, 2008, or refer to recent issues of the Diaspora journal.
2. For a more detailed discussion of these three perspectives, see Gamlen (2014a).
3. That broader discussion developed further in 2014, when the UN Security Council addressed international security issues arising from the migration of foreign fighters to militant groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State (United Nations Security Council 2014).
4. The Geographic Proximity term merits additional explanation to what is provided in Table 1. We treat the term as a spatial lag of a weighted average of lagged dependent variable measures for other neighbouring origin states relative to the focal origin state. Think of the following expression:

   \[
   \text{Geographic proximity}_{ijt} = \sum_{i=2}^{n} \frac{y_{i,t-1}}{(\text{distance weight}_i)}
   \]

   The geographic proximity of origin state \(i\) (in region \(j\)) in year \(t\) is a function of the weighted distance of \(n\) other origin states with diaspora institutions in year \(t-1\). Lagged values of \(y\) for these other origin states are weighted by their geographical distance from the focal origin state and then summed. **Distance weight** is calculated as the distance from the focal origin state \(i\) to a neighbouring state \(i\) with a diaspora institution. A neighbouring origin state that is closer to the focal origin state will have a lower **Distance weight** value in the denominator, thus resulting in a larger weight in the overall Geographic Proximity measure for origin state \(i\) in year \(t\).
5. The UIA Index also merits additional explanation to what is provided in Table 1. It is an index based on an origin-state’s level of involvement with more than 50 migration-related organisations tracked by the Union of International Associations. Examples include the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees and the IOM. We add two points to an origin-state’s UIA Index value for full membership in one of these organisations. We add one point for partial membership.
6. We use Stata Version 12 statistical software (StataCorp 2011) for our Cox regression estimates (i.e., stcox) and post-estimation plots (i.e., stcurve). This Cox estimator permits the use of robust (to heteroskedasticity) standard errors clustered on origin states. We also obtain results consistent with those reported below if clustering standard errors on regions and with the inclusion of regional dummy variable terms. These results are available from the authors.
7. The data used here record the existence or non-existence of at least one formal diaspora institution of any type from 1990–2012. The data were gathered over a 10-year period by one of the authors (Gamlen) through a range of in-depth high-level interviews, targeted international questionnaire surveys, analysis of official statements and media reports, monitoring diaspora institution websites, participant observation at international conferences, and review of secondary academic and policy studies. All sources are catalogued and appear in Gamlen (forthcoming). Researchers integrated these data into case studies about the emergence of institutions in individual United Nations member states. Those case studies permitted us to judge about when, and what type of, a diaspora institution emerged or did not emerge in each origin state over time. Multiple researchers were given the same coding scheme to test the validity and reliability of each other’s findings. The full data set was revised and updated on an approximately annual basis from 2010 to 2013.

8. The 113 states by region are: **East Asia and the Pacific:** Australia, Cambodia, Fiji, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Thailand and Vietnam; **Europe and Central Asia:** Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey and United Kingdom; **Latin America:** Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela; **Middle East and North Africa:** Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Syrian Arab Republic; **South Asia:** Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; **Sub-Saharan Africa:** Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See our concluding section of the study for additional information on when countries from various regions established diaspora institutions from 1990 to 2013.

9. See Table 1 for additional descriptive statistics.

10. In unreported results, we find a similar effect for foreign aid dependence – as states increase their reliance on and adherence to other states and supranational organisations, they may be more likely to follow norms of global governance.

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