• Mar


Finance Guest Seminar: Toni Whited

  • TIME:
    10:30am to 12:00pm

The Carlson Finance department welcomes Toni Whited, from the University of Michigan, to present her work:

Title: Information Distortion, R&D, and Growth


Does firms' opportunistic information disclosure affect investment in R&D? To answer this question, we estimate a dynamic model of long-term growth based on innovation through R&D.  In the model, managers have an incentive to distort observable earnings, where this incentive arises from the combination of incomplete investor information and convex manager compensation incentives based on the stock price. Managers distort earnings by misreporting or by deviating from first-best R&D policy.  The model fits a broad set of moments related to both real R&D expenditures and earnings restatements. Counterfactuals show that regulations preventing information concealment incentivize managers to distort  real R&D investment, whose volatility rises by 10%.  This excess volatility lowers firm value by 0.5%.