Measuring Economic Rents in the Mutual Fund Industry*

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Abstract

We introduce a new measure of active mutual fund manager skill that is based on the dollar-value a manager adds as opposed to the abnormal return he generates. We find that not only does skill exist (the average mutual fund manager adds about $2 million per year), but it is persistent, as far out as 10 years. We further document that investors recognize this skill and reward it by investing more capital with skilled managers. Not only are higher skilled managers paid more, but there is a strong positive correlation between current compensation and future performance. Finally, we find no evidence of a superstar effect — managers are compensated proportionately in the value they add.

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An important principle of economics is that agents earn economic rents if and only if they have a skill in short supply. As central as this principle is to microeconomics, surprisingly little empirical work has addressed the question of whether or not talent is actually rewarded, or, perhaps more interestingly, whether people without talent can earn rents. One notable exception is the research on mutual fund managers. There, an extensive literature in financial economics has been amassed that has focused on the question of whether stock picking or market timing talent exists. The overall conclusion of that literature is that it does not. Considering that mutual fund managers are amongst the highest paid members of society, this conclusion represents a clear violation of the economic principal relating skill to rents. It implies that it is possible to make economic rents without possessing a skill in short supply.

Given the importance of the question, the objective of this paper is to re-examine whether or not mutual fund managers do earn economic rents without possessing skill. In contrast to the existing literature, we find that the average mutual fund manages does have skill, and uses his talents to add value — about $2 million a year. As to be expected, this skill is persistent. We show that it is possible, using our measure of skill, to predict long-term performance, in some cases as long as 10 years into the future. Unlike other high reward industries (like movies or sports), we find no evidence of a superstar effect as defined by Rosen (1981). On the other hand, we do find that the distribution of managerial talent is consistent with the predictions of Lucas (1978) — higher skilled managers manage larger funds and reap higher rewards.

Our methodology for measuring the value managers add differs from prior work in a number of important respects. First we use all actively managed equity mutual funds thereby greatly increasing the power of our tests. Prior work has shorter time periods and focused attention exclusively on funds that hold only U.S. stocks. Second, we use a tradable benchmark to evaluate managers. Prior work has used portfolios that not only are not marketed (and so ignore transactions costs) but were also not necessarily known at the time. Our benchmark consists of all available Vanguard index funds (including funds that hold non-U.S. stocks).

Finally, most prior studies use the net alpha to investors, i.e., the average abnormal return net of fees and expenses, as the measure of managerial skill. However, as Berk and Green (2004) argue, if managerial skill is in short supply, the return to investors is determined in equilibrium by competition between investors, and not by the skill of managers. One might hypothesize, based on this insight, that the gross alpha (the average abnormal return gross of fees and expenses) would be the correct measure of managerial skill, but this hypothesis is also flawed. The gross alpha is a return measure, not a value measure. That is, a manager who adds a gross alpha of 1% on a $10 billion fund adds more value than a manager who adds a gross alpha of 10% on a $1 million fund. Thus the correct measure of managerial skill is the product of the manager’s gross alpha and assets under management. This measure consists of two pieces: the amount of money the manager takes home for himself (his fee multiplied by
the assets-under-management) plus the amount he takes from or gives to investors (the overall dollar under- or over-performance relative to the benchmark).

The mutual fund industry provides a promising environment to study how managerial talent is rewarded and employed because that industry is one of the few industries where it is possible to directly measure, albeit with noise, the talent of the manager and the size of the firm. One of our most surprising results is that investors appear to accurately identify talent and correctly compensate it. We show that if we sort funds into deciles based on current compensation (in dollars) rather than past value added, soil is even more predictable. Furthermore, we demonstrate that there is a tight relationship between compensation and value added.

Even though Lucas’ and Rosen’s original papers on the subject are over 30 years old, economists ability to test their models has been limited by the availability of data. Much of our intuition of how talent is rewarded is based on evidence from industries such as sports and movies where talent is easily measured. This paper demonstrates that this intuition is not easily generalizable. In a relatively large industry like money management we find no evidence of a superstar effect — the most talented managers do not appear to earn disproportionately more money. Furthermore, the evidence provides insight into why a superstar effect is absent. An important assumption in that literature is that the demand for talent is finite. But in the mutual fund setting, as the supply of positive alpha investment opportunities is increased, the excess demand for such opportunities does not decrease. That is, all talented managers can attract capital and so the less talented managers do not suffer from a drying up of demand as in Rosen (1981). Consequently, the highest talented managers do not become superstars.

The results in this paper have implications for other industries. Because of the prevalence of superstar effects in the industries that have been previously studied, it is tempting to consider these results as a norm for most industries. For example, researchers have pointed to the large differences in compensation between the chief executive and his lieutenant within an organization to argue that the difference is unlikely to be caused by talent differences alone. But because talent is largely unobservable, such assertions are often based on indirect evidence. Instead, we would argue that most markets for CEO talent are more similar to the market for managerial talent in mutual funds than the kind of labor markets in which economists have observed superstar effects. CEOs, like mutual fund managers, are rewarded for finding positive net-present-value (NPV) investment opportunities. The supply of capital for such opportunities, like positive alpha investment opportunities, is large. One would not expect the supply of capital to the highest talented managers to affect the supply of investment capital for less talented managers who nevertheless are still capable of supplying positive NPV projects.

The primary objective of this paper is to measure the skill of mutual fund managers. Our perspective is therefore different to most papers in the mutual fund literature that are primarily

1See, for example, Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993)
concerned with the abnormal return investors earn in the fund. However we do provide new insight on that question as well. Using the measure of abnormal return used in prior work (either the equally weighted or value weighted net alpha) we no longer find evidence of underperformance. However, because these measures do not take into account overall net flows in and out of the industry, they do not correspond to the average return of the average investor. When the net alpha of the average investor is computed correctly by weighting the per period net alpha by the total amount of assets under management we do find evidence of underperformance. Over the time period in our sample, the average investor underperformed our passive benchmark by 70 b.p./annum.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the literature. In Section 2 we derive our measure of skill and in the following section explain how we estimate it. We describe the data in Section 4. Section 5 demonstrates that skill exists. We then analyze how this skill is rewarded in Section 6. Section 7 investigates what portion of managerial skill is attributable to diversification services rather than other sources such as stock picking or market timing. Section 8 concludes the paper.

1 Background

The idea that active mutual fund managers lack skill has its roots in the very early days of modern financial economics (Jensen (1968)). Indeed, the original papers that introduced the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama (1965, 1970)) cite the evidence that, as a group, investors in active mutual funds underperform the market, and, more importantly, mutual fund performance is unpredictable. Although an extensive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, the conclusion of the literature is that as investment vehicles, active funds underperform passive ones, and, on average, mutual fund returns before fees show no evidence of outperformance. As we have already mentioned, this evidence is taken to imply that active managers do not have the skills required to beat the market, and so in Burton Malkiel’s words: the “study of mutual funds does not provide any reason to abandon a belief that securities markets are remarkably efficient.” (Malkiel, 1995, p. 571)

In a recent paper on the subject, Fama and French (2010) re-examine the evidence and conclude that the average manager lacks skill. They do find some evidence of talent in the upper tail of the distribution of managers. However based on their estimate of skill (gross alpha) they conclude that this skill is economically small. In this paper we argue that the economic magnitude of skill can only be assessed by measuring the total dollar value added not the abnormal return generated. As we will see, when the economic value added is calculated by multiplying the gross alpha by assets under management, a completely different picture emerges in our data set — the top 10% of managers are able to use their skill to add about $24 million a year on average. Researchers have also studied persistence in mutual fund performance. Using
the return the fund makes for its investors, a number of papers (see Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Zheng (1999) and Bollen and Busse (2001)) have documented that performance is largely unpredictable, leading researchers to conclude that performance is driven by luck rather than talent. In contrast, we show that the value added of a manager is highly persistent.

Despite the widespread belief that managers lack skill, there is in fact a literature in financial economics that does find evidence of skill. One of the earliest papers is Grinblatt and Titman (1989), which documents positive gross alphas for small funds and growth funds. In a followup paper, Grinblatt and Titman (1993), these authors show that at least for a subset of mutual fund managers, stocks perform better when they are held by the managers than when they are not. Wermers (2000) finds that the stocks mutual funds hold outperform broad market indices, and Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) find that stocks managers’ buy outperform stocks that they sell. Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006) use a bootstrap analysis and find evidence, using gross and net alphas, suggesting that 10% of managers have skill. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) compare the actual performance of funds to the performance of the funds’ beginning of quarter holdings and find that for the average fund, performance is indistinguishable, suggesting superior performance gross of fees and thus implying that the average manager adds value during the quarter. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) show that the amount a fund deviates from its benchmark is associated with better performance, and that this superior performance is persistent. Finally Cohen, Polk, and Sili (2010) and Jiang, Verbeek, and Wang (2011) show that this performance results from overweighing stocks that subsequently outperform the stocks that are underweighted.

There is also evidence suggesting where this skill comes from. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that geography is important — funds that invest a greater proportion of their assets locally do better. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) find that funds that concentrate in industries do better than funds that do not. Baker, Litov, Wachtner, and Wurgler (2010) show that, around earnings announcement dates, stocks that active managers purchase outperform stocks they sell and Shumway, Szefer, and Yuan (2009) produce evidence that superior performance is associated with beliefs that more closely predict future performance. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) find that portfolio managers place larger bets on firms they are connected to through their social network, and perform significantly better on these holdings relative to their non-connected holdings. These studies suggest that the superior performance documented in other studies in this literature is likely due to specialized knowledge and information.

Yet many researchers in financial economics remain unconvinced that mutual fund managers have skill. This reticence to accept the above evidence is at least partly attributable to the lack of any convincing evidence of the existence of significant rents attributable to this skill. Our

\footnote{Some evidence of persistence does exist in low liquidity sectors or at shorter horizons, see, for example, Bollen and Busse (2005), Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2008) or Berk and Tonks (2007).}
objective is to provide this evidence.

2 Theory and Definitions

Let \( R_{it}^n \) denote the excess return (that is, the return in excess of the risk free rate) earned by investors in the \( i \)'th fund at time \( t \). This return can be split up into the return of the investor’s next best alternative investment opportunity \( R_{it}^B \), which we will call the manager’s benchmark, and a deviation from the benchmark \( \varepsilon_{it} \):

\[
R_{it}^n = R_{it}^B + \varepsilon_{it},
\]

(1)

The most commonly used measure of skill in the literature is the mean of \( \varepsilon_{it} \), or the net alpha, denoted by \( \alpha_{ni} \). Assuming that the benchmark return is observed (we relax this assumption later), the net alpha can be consistently estimated by:

\[
\hat{\alpha}_i^n = \frac{1}{T_i} \sum_{t=1}^{T_i} (R_{it}^n - R_{it}^B) = \frac{1}{T_i} \sum_{t=1}^{T_i} \varepsilon_{it}.
\]

(2)

where \( T_i \) is the number of periods that fund \( i \) appears in the database. This is a measure of the abnormal return earned by investors. To understand why, recall the intuition that Eugene Fama used to motivate the Efficient Market Hypothesis — just as the expected return of a firm does not reflect the quality of its management, neither does the expected return of a mutual fund. Instead, what the net alpha measures is the rationality and competitiveness of capital markets. A zero net alpha indicates that markets are competitive and investors rational. A positive net alpha implies that capital markets are not competitive, that the supply of capital is insufficient to compete away the abnormal return. A negative net alpha implies that investors are committing too much capital to active management — it is evidence of sub-optimality on the part of at least some investors. So the inference that should be drawn from the widely documented empirical result that the average actively managed mutual fund underperforms the market is that some investors’ behavior departs from the rational paradigm. Why this irrational behavior persists in the mutual fund industry is a largely unexplored empirical question.\(^3\)

Some have argued that the gross alpha, \( \alpha_i^g \), the abnormal return earned by fund \( i \) before management expenses are deducted, should be used to measure managerial skill. Let \( R_{it}^g \) denote the gross excess return, or the excess return the manager makes before he takes out his fee \( f_{it} \):

\[
R_{i,t}^g \equiv R_{it}^n + f_{i,t} = R_{it}^B + \varepsilon_{it} + f_{i,t}
\]

(3)

\(^3\)Glode, Hollifield, Kacperczyk, and Kogan (2009) document that this irrationality varies by market conditions.
The gross alpha can then be consistently estimated as:

\[ \hat{\alpha}_i^g = \frac{1}{T_i} \sum_{t=1}^{T_i} (R_{it}^g - R_{it}^B) = \frac{1}{T_i} \sum_{t=1}^{T_i} (f_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{it}). \]  

Unfortunately, gross alpha does not measure the skill of a manager either. Just as the internal rate of return cannot be used to measure the value of an investment opportunity (it is the net present value that does), the gross alpha cannot be used to measure the value of a manager. It measures the return the manager makes, not the value she adds.

To correctly measure the skill of the manager, one has to measure the dollar value of what the manager adds over the benchmark. To compute this measure, we multiply the benchmark adjusted realized gross return \( R_{it}^g - R_{it}^B \) by the real size of the fund (assets under management adjusted by inflation) at the end of the previous period, \( q_{i,t-1} \), to obtain the realized value added between times \( t - 1 \) and \( t \):

\[ V_{it} \equiv q_{i,t-1} (R_{it}^g - R_{it}^B) = q_{i,t-1} f_{i,t} + q_{i,t-1} \varepsilon_{it}, \]

where the second equality follows from (3). This estimate of value added consists of two parts — the part the manager takes home with him as compensation (the dollar value of all fees charged), which is necessarily positive, plus any value he provides (or extracts from) investors, which can be either positive or negative. Our measure of skill is the (time series) expectation of (5):

\[ S_i \equiv E[V_{it}]. \]

For a fund that exists for \( T_i \) periods this estimated value added is given by:

\[ \hat{S}_i = \sum_{t=1}^{T_i} \frac{V_{it}}{T_i}. \]

The average quality of mutual fund managers can be estimated in one of two ways. If we are interested in the mean of the distribution managers are drawn from, what we term the ex-ante distribution, then a consistent estimate of average value added is given by:

\[ \bar{S} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{S}_i, \]

where \( N \) is the number of mutual funds in our database. Alternatively we might be interested in the mean of surviving mutual fund managers, what we term the ex-post distribution. In this case the average value added is estimated by weighting each manager’s value added by the number
of periods that manager appears in the database:

$$\bar{S}_W = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} T_i \hat{S}_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} T_i}.$$  \hfill (9)

Before we turn to how we actually compute $V_{it}$ and therefore $S_i$, it is worth first considering what the main hypotheses in the literature imply about this measure of skill.

**Unskilled managers, irrational investors**

A widely accepted hypothesis and the one considered in Fama and French (2010) is that no manager has skill. We call this the **strong form no-skill hypothesis**, originally put forward by Eugene Fama in his Efficient Market papers. Because unskilled managers charge fees, the fees can only come out of irrational investors’ pockets. These managers can either invest in the index, in which case they do not destroy value, or worse than that, follow the classic example of “monkey investing” by throwing darts and incurring unnecessary transaction costs. So under this hypothesis:

$$S_i \leq 0, \text{ for every } i,$$  \hfill (10)

$$\alpha^n_{it} \leq -E(f_{it}), \text{ for every } i.$$  \hfill (11)

Because no individual manager has skill, the average manager does not have skill either. Thus this hypothesis also implies that we should expect to find

$$\bar{S} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{S}_i \leq 0$$  \hfill (12)

The latter equation can also be tested in isolation. We term this the **weak form no-skill hypothesis**. This weak-form hypothesis states that even though some individual managers may have skill, the average manager does not, implying that at least as much value is destroyed by active mutual fund managers as is created. We will take this two part hypothesis as the Null Hypothesis in this paper.

**Skilled managers, rational investors**

The second hypothesis we consider is motivated by Berk and Green (2004) and states that managers have skill that is in short supply. Because of competition in capital markets, investors do not benefit from this skill and managers derive the full benefit of the economic rents they generate from their skill. If investors are fully rational then these assumptions imply that the net return investors expect to make is equal to the benchmark return. That is:

$$\alpha^n_{it} = 0, \text{ for every } i.$$  \hfill (13)
Because fees are positive, the expected value-added is positive for every manager:

\[ S_i > 0, \text{ for every } i. \]  

(14)

When investors cannot observe skill perfectly, the extent to which an individual manager actually adds value depends on the ability of investors to differentiate talented managers from charlatans. If we recognize that managerial skill is difficult to measure, then one would expect unskilled managers to take advantage of this uncertainty. In this case we would expect to observe the presence of charlatans — managers who charge a fee but have no skill. Thus when skill cannot be perfectly observed, it is possible that for some managers \( S_i = 0 \), so

\[ S_i \geq 0, \text{ for every } i. \]  

(15)

However, even when skill is not perfectly observable, because investors are rational, every manager must still add value in expectation. Hence, under this hypothesis, the average manager must generate value and hence we would expect to find:

\[ \bar{S} > 0. \]  

(16)

We will take this hypothesis as the Alternative Hypothesis in this paper.

Some have claimed, based on Sharpe (1991), that in a general equilibrium it is impossible for the average manager to add value. In fact this argument has two flaws. To understand the flaws, it is worth quickly reviewing Sharpe’s original argument. Sharpe divided all investors into two sets: people who hold the market portfolio, who he called “passive” investors and the rest, who he called “active” investors. Because market clearing requires that the sum of active and passive investors’ portfolios is the market portfolio, the sum of just active investors’ portfolios must also be the market portfolio. This observation immediately implies that the abnormal return of the average active investor must be zero. As convincing as the argument appears to be, it cannot be used to conclude that the average active mutual fund manager cannot add value. In his definition of “active” investors, Sharpe includes any investor not holding the market, not just active mutual fund managers. If active individual investors exist, then as a group active mutual fund managers could provide a positive abnormal return by making trading profits from individual investors who make a negative abnormal return. Of course, as a group individual active investors are better off investing in the market, which leaves open the question of why these individuals are actively trading.

Perhaps more surprisingly to some, Sharpe’s argument does not rule out the possibility that the average active manager can earn a higher return than the market return even if all investors, including individual investors, are assumed to be fully rational. What Sharpe’s argument ignores is that even a passive investor must trade at least twice, once to get into the passive position.
and once to get out of the position. If we assume that active investors are better informed than passive, then whenever these liquidity trades are made with an active investor, in expectation, the passive investor must lose and the active must gain. Hence, the expected return to active investors must exceed the return to passive investors, that is, active investors earn a liquidity premium.

3 Choice of Benchmarks and Estimation

To measure the value the mutual fund manager either gives or takes from investors, her performance must be compared to the performance of the next best investment opportunity available to investors at that time, what we have termed the benchmark. Thus far we have assumed that this benchmark return is known. In reality it is not known, so in this section we describe two methods we use to identify the benchmark.

The standard practice in financial economics is to not actually construct the alternative investment opportunity itself, but rather simply adjust for risk using a factor model. In recent years the extent to which factor models accurately correct for risk has been subject to extensive debate. In response to this, mutual fund researchers have opted to construct the alternative investment opportunity directly instead of using factor models to adjust for risk. That is, they have interpreted the factors in the factor models as investment opportunities available to investors, rather than risk factors.\(^4\) The problem with this interpretation is that these factor portfolios were (and in some cases are) not actually available to investors.

There are two reasons investors cannot invest in the factor portfolios. The first is straightforward: these portfolios do not take transaction costs into account. For example, the momentum strategy requires high turnover, which not only incurs high transaction costs, but also requires time and effort to implement. Consequently momentum index funds do not exist. The second is more subtle. Many of these factor portfolios were discovered well after the typical starting date of mutual fund databases. For example, when the first active mutual funds started offering size and value-based strategies, the alternative investment opportunity set was limited to investments in individual stocks and well-diversified index funds. That is, these active managers were being rewarded for the skill of finding a high return strategy that was not widely known. It has taken a considerable amount of time for most investors to discover these strategies, and so using portfolios that can only be constructed with the benefit of hindsight ignores the skill required to uncover these strategies in real time.

For these reasons we take two approaches to measuring skill in this paper. First, we follow the recent literature by adopting a benchmark approach and taking a stand on the alternative

\(^4\)See, for example, Fama and French (2010). Note that interpreting the benchmarks as alternative investment opportunities is not the same argument as the one made by Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) for using benchmarks.
investment opportunity set. Where we depart from the literature, however, is that we ensure that this alternative investment opportunity was marketed and tradable at the time. Because Vanguard mutual funds are widely regarded as the least costly method to hold a well diversified portfolio, we take the set of passively managed index funds offered by Vanguard as the alternative investment opportunity set. We then define the benchmark as the closest portfolio in that set to the mutual fund. If $R^j_t$ is the excess return earned by investors in the $j$'th Vanguard index fund at time $t$, then the benchmark return for fund $i$ is given by:

$$R^B_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^{n(t)} \beta^j_i R^j_t,$$

where $n(t)$ is the total number of index funds offered by Vanguard at time $t$ and $\beta^j_i$ is obtained from the appropriate linear projection of the $i$'th active mutual fund onto the set of Vanguard index funds. By using Vanguard index funds as benchmarks, we can be certain that investors had the opportunity to invest in the funds at the time, that the returns of these funds necessarily include transaction costs and naturally take into account the dynamic evolution of active strategies.\footnote{Notice, also, that if we use this benchmark to evaluate the manager of one of the Vanguard index funds themselves, we get that this manager adds value equal to the dollar value of the fees he charges. Vanguard managers add value because they provide investors with the lowest cost means to diversification. By using net returns on Vanguard index funds we are explicitly accounting for the value added of diversification services. Because active managers also provide diversification services our measure credits them with this value added as well. We separate the value added from diversification and other skills in Section 7.}

Second, we use the traditional risk-based approach. The standard in the literature implicitly assumes the riskiness of the manager’s portfolio can be measured using the factors identified by Fama and French (1995) and Carhart (1997), hereafter, the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) factor specification. In this case the benchmark return is the return of a portfolio of equivalent riskiness constructed from the FCC factor portfolios:

$$R^B_{it} = \beta^{mkt}_i MKT_t + \beta^{sml}_i SML_t + \beta^{hml}_i HML_t + \beta^{umd}_i UMD_t$$

where $MKT_t, SML_t, HML_t$ and $UMD_t$ are the realizations of the four factor portfolios and $\beta^j_i$ are factor sensitivities of the $i$'th mutual fund, that is, the riskiness of the $i$'th mutual fund, which can be estimated by regressing the fund’s return onto the factors. Although standard practice, this approach has the drawback that no theoretical argument exists justifying why these factors measure systematic risk in the economy. Fama and French (2010) recognize this limitation but argue that one can interpret the factors as simply alternative (passive) investment opportunities. As we point out above, such an interpretation is only valid when the factors are tradable portfolios.
<table>
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<th>Fund Name</th>
<th>Ticker</th>
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<td>Large-Cap Blend</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Small-Cap Value Index</td>
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<td>Small-Cap Value</td>
<td>05/21/1998</td>
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Table 1: **Benchmark Vanguard Index Funds**: This table lists the set of Vanguard Index Funds used to calculate the Vanguard benchmark. *Note that the NAESX fund was originally not an index fund. I was converted to an index fund in late 1989, so the inception date in the table reflects the first date we included the fund in the benchmark set.

We picked eleven Vanguard index funds to use as benchmark funds – see Table 1. We arrived at this set by excluding all bond or real estate index funds and any fund that was already spanned by existing funds.6 Because the eleven funds do not exist throughout our sample period, we first arrange the funds in order of how long they have been in existence. We then construct an orthogonal basis set out of these funds by projecting the $n^{th}$ fund onto the orthogonal basis produced by the first $n-1$ funds over the time period when the $n^{th}$ fund exists. We use the mean plus residual of this projection as the $n^{th}$ fund in the orthogonal basis. In the time periods in which the $n^{th}$ basis fund does not exist, we insert zero. We then construct an augmented basis by replacing the zero in the time periods when the basis fund does not exist with the mean return of the basis fund when it does exist. We show in the appendix that value added can be consistently estimated by first computing the projection coefficients ($\beta_i$ in (17)) using the augmented basis and then calculating the benchmark return using (17) and the basis where missing returns are replaced with zeros.

To quantify the advantages of using Vanguard funds rather than the FFC factor mimicking portfolios as benchmark funds, Table 2 shows the results of regressing each FFC factor mimicking portfolio on the basis set of passively managed index funds offered by Vanguard. Only the market portfolio does not have a statistically significant positive alpha. Clearly, the FFC factor mimicking portfolios were better investment opportunities than what was actually available to

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6The complete list of all Vanguard’s Index funds can be found here: https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/vanguard/all?reset=true&mgtm=i.
investors at the time. In addition, the $R^2$ of the regressions are informative. The value/growth strategy became available as an index fund after size, so it is not surprising that the $R^2$ of the SMB portfolio is higher than the HML portfolio. Furthermore, the momentum strategy involves a large amount of active trading, so it is unlikely to be fully captured by passive portfolios, which accounts for the fact that the UMD portfolio has the lowest $R^2$.

<table>
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<th>MKT</th>
<th>SMB</th>
<th>HML</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t$-Statistic</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Net Alpha of FFC Portfolios: We regress each FFC factor portfolio on the Vanguard Benchmark portfolios. The table lists the estimate (in b.p./month) and $t$-statistic of the constant term (Alpha) of each regression, as well as the $R^2$ of each regression.

Given that the alpha of the FFC factor mimicking portfolios are positive, and that they do not represent actual investable alternatives, they cannot be interpreted as benchmark portfolios. Of course this argument does not rule out that the FFC factor specification does in fact measure risk. For completeness, we will report our results using both methods to calculate the fund’s alpha, but we will always interpret the Vanguard funds as benchmark portfolios and the FFC factor specification as an adjustment for risk.

4 Data

Our main source of data is the CRSP survivorship bias free database of mutual fund data first compiled in Carhart (1997). The data set spans the period from January 1962 to March 2011. Although this data set has been used extensively, it still has a number of important shortcomings that we needed to address in order to complete our study. As a result we undertook an extensive data project to address these shortcomings, the details of which are described in a 17 page online appendix to this paper. The main outcome of this project is reported below.

Even a casual perusal of the returns on CRSP is enough to reveal that some of the reported returns are suspect. Because part of our objective is to identify highly skilled managers, misreported returns, even if random, are of concern. Hence we procured additional data from Morningstar. Each month, Morningstar sends a complete updated database to its clients. The monthly update is intended to completely replace the previous update. We purchased every update from January 1995 through March 2011, and constructed a single database by combining all the updates. One major advantage of this database is that it is guaranteed to be survivorship free. Morningstar adds a new fund or removes an old fund in each new monthly update.
By definition, it cannot change an old update because its clients already have that data. So we are guaranteed that in each month whatever data we have was the actual data available to Morningstar’s clients at that time.

We then compared the returns reported on CRSP to what was reported on Morningstar. Somewhat surprisingly, 3.3% of return observations differed. Even if we restrict attention to returns that differ by more than 10 b.p., 1.3% of the data is inconsistent. An example of this is when a 10% return is accidentally reported as “10.0” instead of “0.10”. To determine which database is correct we used dividend and net asset value (NAV) information reported on the two databases to compute the return. In cases in which on one database the reported return is inconsistent with the computed return but the other database was consistent, we used the consistent database return. If both databases were internally consistent, but differed from each other, but within 6 months one database was internally inconsistent, we used the database that was internally consistent throughout. Finally, we manually checked all remaining unresolved discrepancies that differed by more than 20 b.p. by comparing the return to that reported on Bloomberg. All told, we were able to correct about two thirds of the inconsistent returns. In all remaining cases we used the return reported on CRSP.

Unfortunately, there are even more discrepancies between what Morningstar and CRSP report for total assets under management (AUM). Even allowing for rounding errors, fully 16% of the data differs across the two databases. But casual observation reveals that much of this discrepancy appears to derive from Morningstar often lagging CRSP in updating AUM. Consequently, when both database report numbers we use the numbers reported on CRSP with one important exception. If the number reported on CRSP changed by more than $8 \times$ (we observed a number of cases where the CRSP number is off by a fixed number of decimal places) and within a few months the change was reversed by the same order of magnitude, and, in addition, this change was not observed on Morningstar, we used the value reported on Morningstar. Unfortunately both databases contained significant numbers of missing AUM observations. Even after we used both databases as a source of information, 17.2% of the data was missing. In these cases we filled any missing observation by the most recent observation in the past. Finally we adjusted all AUM numbers by inflation by expressing all numbers in January 1, 2000 dollars.

The amount of missing expense ratio data posed a major problem.\(^7\) To compute the gross return, expense ratios are needed and over 40% of expense ratios are missing on the CRSP database. Because expense ratios are actually reported annually by funds, we were able to fill in about 70% of these missing values by extending any reported observation during a year to the entire fiscal year of the fund and combining the information reported on Morningstar and

\(^7\)Because fees from an important part of our skill measure, we chose not to follow Fama and French (2010) by filling in the missing expense ratios with the average expense ratios of funds with similar AUM.
CRSP. We then went to the SEC web site and manually looked up the remaining missing values on EDGAR. At the end of this process we were missing only 1.6% of the observations, which we elected to drop.

Both databases report data for active and passively managed funds. CRSP does not provide any way to discriminate between the funds. Morningstar provides this information, but the accuracy of their classification is suspect. In addition we only have this information after 1995 when the Morningstar database begins. We therefore augmented the Morningstar classification by using the following algorithm to identify passively managed funds. We first generate a list of common phrases that appear in fund names identified by Morningstar as index funds. We then compile a list of funds with these common phrases that were not labeled as index funds by Morningstar and compile a second list of common phrases from these funds’ names. We then manually checked the original prospectuses of any fund that contained a word from the first list but was not identified as an index fund at any point in its life by Morningstar or was identified as an index fund at some point in its life by Morningstar but nevertheless contained a phrase in the second list. Funds that were not tracked by Morningstar (e.g., only existed prior to 1995) that contained a word from the first list were also manually checked. Finally, we also manually checked cases in which fund names satisfied any of these criteria in some periods but not in others even when the Morningstar classification was consistent with our name classification to verify that indeed the fund had switched from active to passive or vice versa. We reclassified 14 funds using this algorithm.

It is important to identify subclasses of mutual funds because both databases report subclasses as separate funds. In most cases the only difference amongst subclasses is the amount of expenses charged to investors, so simply including them as separate funds would artificially increase the statistical significance of any identified effect. For funds that appear in the CRSP data base, identifying subclasses is a relatively easy process — CRSP provides a separator in the fund name (either a “:” or a “/”). Information after the separator denotes a subclass. Unfortunately, Morningstar does not provide this information, so for mutual funds that only appear on the Morningstar database we used the last word in the fund name to identify the subclass (the details of how we did this are in the online appendix). Once identified we aggregated all subclasses into a single fund.

We dropped all index funds, bond funds and money market funds\(^8\) and any fund observations before the fund’s (inflation adjusted) AUM reached $5 million. We also dropped funds with less than 2 years of data. In the end we were left with 6054 equity funds. This sample is considerably larger than comparable samples used by other researchers. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, we do not restrict attention to funds that hold only U.S. equity. Clearly, managerial skill,

\(^8\) We classed a fund as a bond fund if it held, on average, less than 50% of assets in stocks and identified a money market fund as a fund that on average held more than 20% of assets in cash.
if it exists, could potentially be used to pick non-U.S. stocks. More importantly, by eliminating any fund that holds any non-U.S. stock, researchers have been eliminating managers who might have the skill to opportunistically move capital to and from the U.S.\(^9\) Second, the Morningstar database contains funds not reported on CRSP. Third, we use the longest possible sample length available.

When we use the Vanguard benchmark to compute alpha we chose to begin the sample in the period just after Vanguard introduced its S&P 500 index fund — January, 1977. Because few funds exist before that date, the loss in data is minimal — we are still left with 5974 funds.

## 5 Results

We begin by first measuring managerial skill and then we test the extent to which investors profit from this skill.

### 5.1 Measuring Skill

We begin by estimating \(S_i\) for every equity fund in our sample. Table 3 provides the results. The average manager adds an economically significant $140,000 per month (in Y2000 dollars). The standard error of this average is just $30,000, implying at \(t\)-statistic of 4.57, so we can easily reject the Null hypothesis that the mean is zero or less at the 99% confidence level. There is also a large amount of variation across funds. The least skilled manager amongst the top 1% of managers is able to generate $7.82 million per month. Even the least skilled manager amongst the top 10% of managers generates $750,000 a month on average. The median manager lost an average of $20,000/month and only 43% of managers have positive estimated value added. In summary, most funds have negative value added but because most of the capital is controlled by skilled managers, on average, active mutual funds add value.

Thus far we have ignored survivorship bias, that is, successful funds are more likely to survive in the data base longer than unsuccessful funds. Equivalently, one can think of the above statistics as estimates of the \(ex-ante\) distribution of talent. We can instead take account of the survivorship bias and compute the time-weighted mean given by (9). In this case we get an estimate of the \(ex-post\) distribution of talent. Not surprisingly this estimate is higher. The average manager adds a highly significant $270,000/month. When we use the FFC factor specification to correct for risk, we obtain very similar results.\(^10\)

\(^9\)It is important to appreciate that most of the additional funds still hold mainly U.S. stocks, it is just that they also hold some non-U.S. stocks. As we will discuss in Section 7 expanding the sample to all equity funds is not innocuous — not only is the statistical power of our tests greatly increased but, more importantly, we will show that the bulk of managerial skill is concentrated in funds that invest at least some capital in non-U.S. stocks.

\(^10\)For the reasons pointed out in Lillainmaa (2012) our measures of value added underestimates the true skill of managers.
Table 3: Value Added ($\hat{S}_i$): For every fund in our database we estimate the monthly value added, $\hat{S}_i$. The Cross-Sectional mean, standard error, $t$-statistic and percentiles are the statistical properties of this distribution. Percent with less than zero is the fraction of the distribution that has value added estimates less than zero. The Cross-Sectional Weighted mean, standard error and $t$-statistic are computed by weighting by the number of periods the fund exists, that is, they are the statistical properties of $\bar{S}_W$ defined by (9). The numbers are reported in Y2000 $\text{m} \text{illions per month.}$

A central tenant of the literature on skill in mutual fund management is that if indeed managers have skill, then their skill should be persistent. Consequently, if the value added identified in Table 3 results from managerial skill rather than just luck, we must also see evidence that this measure of value added is persistent — managers that have in the past have added value should continue to add value in the future.

To test for persistence we follow the existing literature and sort funds into deciles based on our inference of the skill of managers. We use the $t$-static of the value added estimate, $\hat{S}_t$, measured over the entire history of the fund until some time $t$, which we term the sorting period, to infer skill.\footnote{Similar results obtain if we use the value added estimate itself to sort funds.} That is, the funds in the 10th (top) decile are the funds where we have the most confidence that the actual value added over the sorting period is positive. Similarly, funds in the
1st (bottom) decile are funds where we have the most confidence that the actual value added in the sorting period is negative. We then measure the average value added of managers in each decile over a specified future time horizon, hereafter the \textit{measurement horizon}.

The main difficulty with implementing this strategy is uncertainty in the estimate of the fund’s gross alpha. To estimate the alpha of a fund, it is necessary to estimate the fund’s betas and this process necessarily involves estimation error. When estimation error in the sorting period is positively correlated to the error in the measurement horizon, a researcher could falsely conclude that evidence of persistence exists when there is no persistence. To avoid this bias we do not use data from the sorting period to estimate the gross alpha and betas in the measurement horizon. This means that we require a measurement horizon of sufficient length to produce reliable alpha estimates, so the shortest measurement horizon we consider is 3 years.

At the beginning of each time horizon, we use all the information until that point in time to sort firms into 10 deciles based on the $t$-statistic of $\hat{S}_i$. As before we require a fund to have at least 2 years of data to be included in the sort. For each fund in each decile, we then calculate $\hat{S}_{i,t+m\rightarrow t+h}$ over different measurement horizons, $h$, varying between 36 and 120 months using only the information in the measurement horizon. Because we need a minimum number of months, $m$, to estimate the fund’s beta in the measurement horizon, we drop all funds with less data than $m$. To remove the obvious selection bias, for the remaining funds we drop the first $m$ value added observations as well. Because the Vanguard Benchmark has at most 11 factors plus the constant, we use $m = 18$. We use $m = 6$ when we adjust for risk using the FFC factor specification. We then average over funds in each decile in each month, that is, we compute, for each decile, a monthly average value added. At the end of the horizon, funds are again sorted into deciles based on $t$-statistic of value added using all the information until that point and the process is repeated as many times as the data allows.\textsuperscript{12} At the end of the process, in each decile, we have a time series of monthly estimates for average value added. For each decile, we then compute the mean of this time series and its standard error. Figure 1 plots this mean as well as the two standard error bounds for each decile and time horizon.

From Figure 1 it is clear that there is evidence of persistence as far out as 10 years. The point estimate of the average value added of 10th decile managers is positive at every horizon and it always the best preforming decile. The value added estimates are economically large. Although clearly noisy, the average tenth decile manager adds around $2$ million/month. Table 4 formally tests the Null Hypothesis that the value added of 10th decile is zero or less. The Null is rejected at every horizon at the 95\% confidence interval. When the FFC factor specification is used as the risk adjustment a similar story emerges. With only one exception, the tenth decile outperforms all the other deciles and the Null is rejected at every horizon (at the 95\% confidence interval).

\textsuperscript{12}We choose the starting point to ensure that the last month is always included in the sample.
Figure 1: Out of Sample Value Added
Each graph displays average out of sample value added, \( \hat{S}_i \) (in Y2000 $ million/month), of funds sorted into deciles on the \( t \)-statistic of value added, over the future horizon indicated. The solid line indicates the performance of each decile and the dashed lines indicated the 95% confidence bands (two standard errors from the estimate). Panel A shows the results when value added is computed using Vanguard index funds as benchmark portfolios and Panel B shows the results using the FFC risk adjustment.
Table 4: Out-of-sample Performance of the Top Decile: The columns labeled “Value Added” reports the average value added of the top decile at each horizon and the associated p-value. The next two columns report the fraction of the time and associate p-value the top decile has a higher value added realization than the bottom decile. The columns labeled “Top in Top Half” report the fraction of time the realized value added of the top decile is in the top half and the final column reports the average fraction of total AUM in the top decile. All p-values are one tailed, that is, the probability, under the Null of the observed value or greater

If managers are skilled, and there are cross-sectional differences in the amount of skill, then relative performance will be persistent. Hence we can use relative performance comparisons to construct a more powerful test of the Null hypothesis (that skill does not exist) by counting the number of times the 10th decile outperforms the 1st, and the number of times the 10th decile is in the top half. As is evident from Table 4, the Null Hypothesis can be rejected at the 95% confidence level at almost all horizons. The FFC factor specification produces much more definitive results — with the sole exception of the 9 year horizon, the Null can be rejected at the 99% confidence level.

It might be tempting, based on our sorts, to conclude that all the skill is concentrated in

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13Because the volatility of the deciles varies, we restrict attention to tests where the probability under the Null is not a function of the volatility of the decile.
10th decile managers, that is, at most 10% of managers actually have skill. But caution is in order here. Our sorts are unlikely to separate skill perfectly. Although the estimates of value added in the other deciles are not significantly different from zero, they are almost all positive. Since we know that many managers destroyed value over the sample period, these positive point estimates imply that enough skilled managers are distributed throughout the other deciles to overcome the significant fraction of managers that destroy value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vanguard Benchmark</th>
<th>FFC Risk Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equally Weighted</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>-3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-statistic</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Weighted</td>
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<td>-5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-statistic</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Value Weighted</td>
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<td>-4.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-statistic</td>
<td>-8.05</td>
<td>-6.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: **Net Alpha (in b.p./month):** The table reports the net alpha of three investment strategies: Investing $1 every month by equally weighting over all existing funds (*Equally Weighted*), Investing $1 every month by value weighting (based on AUM) over all existing funds (*Value Weighted*), and investing a fixed proportion of the total amount of capital under active equity management in that month, value weighted over all existing funds (*Time Value Weighted*).

### 5.2 Returns to Investors

Given the evidence of skill, a natural question to ask is who benefits from this skill? That is, do mutual fund managers (companies) capture all the rents from their skill, or are these rents shared with investors? Table 5 provides summary evidence. The average net alpha across all funds is not significantly different from zero, so there is no evidence that investors share in the fruits of this skill. However, this statistic does not tell the full story. The average investor does not make the average alpha because the amount of money under management varies across funds. Even the value weighted alpha (which is also not statistically different from zero) does not fully reflect investor returns because it does not take into account inflows and outflows from the sector as a whole. A better measure of the average return to the representative investor is what we term the “Time Value Weighted Alpha.” This is the average return weighted by the proportion of capital under management in that period to the total amount of capital under management in all periods. That is, periods in which the total amount of assets under management in the mutual fund sector receive a higher weight. It is clear from Table 5 that this measure produces a much lower estimate of the net alpha (-70 b.p./year) and is statistically significantly different from zero. All three estimates produce statistically significantly negative net alphas when the
FFC factors are used as a measure of risk. But relying on these estimates requires the additional assumption that this model correctly measures risk. As we will see presently, it is not obvious that this assumption is justified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A: Vanguard Benchmark</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Added</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Alpha</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUM</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
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<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.32</td>
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<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B: FCC Risk Adjustment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Added</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>2.08</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-19</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUM</td>
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<td>261</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>446</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.33</td>
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<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
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<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: **Characteristics of Deciles Sorted on t-statistics of Value Added**: Value Added is the within decile average $\hat{S}_i$ in Y2000 $\$ millions/month, Compensation is the within decile average of $\sum q_i f_{it}/T_i$, (in Y2000 $\$ millions/month), Fees (in %/annum) is the within decile average $\sum f_{it}/T_i$, Net Alpha (in b.p./month) is the value weighted average intercept term of net returns regressed on the benchmark, AUM is average assets under management (in Y2000 $\$ millions) and Age is the average number of monthly observations in the decile.

6 Skill and Labor Market Efficiency

To see how realized value added is cross-sectionally distributed in the sample, we sorted funds into deciles based on the t-statistic of the estimate of value added over the full sample. The first row of Table 6 gives the average value added in each decile. There is clearly large variation in the data. The worst decile destroyed almost $800,000 (Y2000) per month while the largest decile added about $2 million. Only the top 4 deciles add value, but managers in these deciles control 52% of the capital under management. Net-alpha increases over the deciles. Interestingly, the realized net alpha is greater than zero for all the deciles that added value and is less than zero in all deciles that destroyed value. At least ex-post, managers that added value also gave up some of this value to their investors.
Figure 2: Out of Sample Net Alpha
Each graph displays the out of sample performance (in b.p./month) of funds sorted into deciles on the $t$-statistic of value added, $\hat{S}_i$, over the horizon indicated. The solid line indicates the performance of each decile and the dashed lines indicated the 95% confidence bands (two standard errors from the estimate). Panel A shows the results when net alpha is computed using Vanguard index funds as benchmark portfolios and Panel B shows the results using the FFC risk adjustment.
What about *ex-ante*? That is, would an investor who identified a skilled manager based on passed data have expected a positive net alpha? To investigate this possibility we calculate the average net alpha of investing in the out-of-sample sorts. That is, in each decile, for each fund and at each point in time we calculate the net abnormal return,

\[ \varepsilon_{it} = R_{it}^n - R_{it}^B \]

over measurement horizons of 3 to 10 years. As before, we drop the first \( m \) observations in the measurement horizon, where \( m = 18 \) or 6 months for the Vanguard Benchmark and the FFC factor specification respectively. We then compute, at each point in time, the weighted average net abnormal return of each decile. At the end of the process, in each decile, we have a time series of monthly estimates for the weighted average net alpha of each decile. That is, the time series represents the realized net alpha of investing $1 each month in a value weighted portfolio of funds in the decile. To get the average net alpha of this strategy, we compute the mean of this time series and its standard error. Figure 2 plots this mean as well as the two standard error bounds for each decile and time horizon.

Almost all net alpha estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero. As we show in Table 7, the point estimates of the tenth decile are very close to zero and mostly negative. None are statistically significantly different from zero, but as we noted above, this test has low power. The order statistics provide a more powerful test. These tests confirm the overall impression from Table 7, there is little evidence of predictability in net alpha. Of the 16 order statistics, only 3 of them have a one tailed \( p \)-value below 5%, that is, are statistically positive. In 3 cases the realized frequency is below 50%, that is, the top under performed the bottom or the top decile was more often in the lower half. So, at best, there is weak evidence that by picking the best managers, investors can get better returns than by picking the worst managers. Instead, the evidence appears more consistent with the idea that competition in capital markets drives net alphas to zero.

In this case there is a striking difference when we use the FCC factor specification as a risk adjustment — there is strong, statistically significant evidence of relative performance differences across the deciles. Both Figure 2 and Table 7 provide convincing out of sample evidence that investors could have done better by picking the better managers (based on the \( t \)-statistic of past value added). Investors who invested with *ex-ante* better managers earned higher alphas than investors who invested with worse managers. These out of sample net alpha results are intriguing because they imply that either investors are leaving money on the table (not enough funds are flowing to the best managers so positive net alphas result), or investors do not care about the net alpha relative to the FFC factor specification, raising the possibility that the FFC factor specification does not measure the risk investors care about.

The evidence actually paints a picture of remarkable labor market efficiency. First note,
Table 7: Out-of-sample Net-Alpha of the Top Decile: The columns labeled “Net-Alpha” report the weighted average net alpha (in b.p./month) of the top decile at each horizon and the associated p-value. The next two columns report the fraction of the time and associate p-value the top decile has a net alpha realization greater than the bottom decile. The columns labeled “Top in Top Half” report the fraction of time the realized net alpha of the top decile is in the top half. All p-values are one tailed, that is, the probability, under the Null of the observed value or greater.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horizon Years</th>
<th>Net-Alpha b.p.</th>
<th>t-stat.</th>
<th>Top Outperforms Bottom Freq. (%)</th>
<th>p-value (%)</th>
<th>Top in Top Half Freq. (%)</th>
<th>p-value (%)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>59.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
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<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.10</td>
<td>56.09</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>55.44</td>
<td>1.11</td>
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</table>

from Table 6 that the percentage fee is relatively constant across the deciles. However, average compensation across the deciles is close to monotonically increasing, especially in the extreme deciles where we have the most confidence of our estimates of value added.

Ex-post there is a tight relationship between measured skill and compensation. What about ex-ante — once managers reveal their skill by adding value, do investors reward them with higher subsequent compensation? Figure 3 plots out-of-sample compensation and demonstrates that they do. Not only is compensation increasing in the deciles, but the average 10th decile manager earns considerably more than managers in the other deciles. Because the average fee does not differ by much across deciles, by choosing to allocate their capital to skilled managers, it is investors that determine these compensation differences, confirming a central insight in Berk and Green (2004). Figure 3 illustrates, again, that using the FFC risk adjustment makes a material difference. Compensation is still increasing in the deciles, but the differences are
smaller than when the Vanguard benchmark is used.

Figure 3: Out of Sample Compensation
The plots display the average out of sample monthly compensation of each decile sorted on the $t$-statistic of value added using the Vanguard Benchmark and the FFC risk adjustment. Each line in the plots represents a different horizon, which varies between 3 and 10 years.

If investors reward better managers with higher compensation, then they must be able to identify better managers \textit{ex ante}. Thus, compensation should predict performance. To test this inference, we repeated the previous sorting procedure, except we used total compensation rather than the $t$-statistic of value added to sort funds. That is, at the beginning of each time horizon, we use the product of the current AUM and fee to sort funds into the deciles and then follow the identical procedure we used before. Figure 4, summarizes the results — when managers are sorted into deciles by their total compensation the relative difference in performance across the deciles is much larger than when the $t$-statistic of value added is used. One striking difference between Figure 4 and Figure 1 is the increased monotonicity when the sorts are based on compensation. Investors seem to do a much better job differentiating managers than the $t$-statistic of value added.

As is evident from the standard error bounds in Figure 4, tests based on 10th decile order statistics have low power. To increase the power of our tests, we construct an order statistic that is sensitive to the monotonicity of the deciles under the Alternative. Instead of just looking at the frequency that the 10th decile is in the top half, we count the frequency that each of the top 5 deciles is in the top half. Table 8 reports the results. The Null Hypothesis can be rejected at the 95% confidence interval at nearly all horizons. For many years now researchers have characterized the behavior of investors in the mutual fund sector as suboptimal — dumb investors chasing past returns. This evidence suggests quite the opposite. Investors seem to be able to differentiate good managers from bad, and compensate them accordingly.

When FFC factor specification is used as the risk adjustment to calculate value added com-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horizon Years</th>
<th>Vanguard Benchmark p-value (%)</th>
<th>FFC Risk Adjustment p-value (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>53.68 1.26</td>
<td>50.50 32.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>52.95 1.55</td>
<td>52.37 1.15</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>53.73 0.34</td>
<td>51.86 3.70</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>54.68 0.07</td>
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<td>52.23 5.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>53.14 0.73</td>
<td>52.57 0.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: **Out-of-sample Performance of Compensation Sorts:** The columns list the frequency and associated p-value of the joint test that each of the top 5 deciles are in the top half of the decile distribution. All p-values are one tailed, that is, the probability, under the Null of the observed value or greater.

Compensation is a weaker predictor of performance. Bear in mind that the sorting variable does not depend on the benchmark, implying that the funds that make up each decile under the two benchmarks are essentially the same. So what this evidence suggests is that investors do not value performance relative to the FFC factor specification as much as they value performance relative to the Vanguard benchmark. Thus, as Figure 3 demonstrates, they do not reward outperformance as much, suggesting that FFC factor specification does not fully adjust for risks investors care about.

One might be tempted to look at Figure 3 as evidence of Rosen’s superstar effect. However, that interpretation is not correct. As Figure 4 makes clear, the reason tenth decile managers make much more than ninth decile managers is they are much more skilled. That is, if the compensation difference between the 10th and 9th decile was proportionately more than the skill difference, this extra compensation would have come from some source. The only possible source is investors, but as Figure 2 shows, investors neither receive nor give up rents. That being the case, there is no evidence that top managers are paid proportionately more than their talent differences.

### 7 Analyzing Skill

The Vanguard benchmarks are constructed from net returns while the funds’ value added numbers are constructed using gross returns. This means our value-added measure includes both the diversification benefits, as well as other skills and services managers provide. Therefore, if an active manager chooses to do nothing other than exactly replicate a Vanguard benchmark fund, we would compute a positive value added for that manager equal to the diversification

---

14 The only difference derives from the different sample lengths.
Figure 4: Value Added Sorted on Compensation
Each graph displays average out of sample value added, $\hat{S}_i$ (in Y2000 $ million/month), of funds sorted into deciles based on total compensation (fees $\times$ AUM). The solid line indicates the performance of each decile and the dashed lines indicated the 95% confidence bands (two standard errors from the estimate). Panel A shows the results when value added is computed using Vanguard index funds as benchmark portfolios and Panel B shows the results using the FFC risk adjustment.
benefits he provides (i.e., the fees charged by Vanguard times the size of the fund). So a natural question to ask is what fraction of value added is compensation for providing diversification and what fraction can be attributed to other skills.

We answer this question by recomputing value-added using the gross returns (including fees) of the Vanguard funds as the benchmark and comparing that to our earlier measures. By comparing the first two columns of Table 7 it is clear that about half the value added is due to diversification benefits ($70,000 per month) and half ($70,000 per month) is due to other types of skill such as stock picking and/or market timing. Note that we can still easily reject the Null hypothesis at the 99% confidence level that value added computed this way is zero or less. So there is strong evidence that active managers provide more than just diversification benefits. Similar results obtain when we use the ex-post distribution of skill (i.e., equation 9) — slightly less than half the value added can be attributed to diversification benefits.

An alternative way to estimate how much diversification benefits mutual funds provide is to calculate the average value added of all the index funds in our database using Vanguard net returns as the benchmark. The forth column of Table 7 provides the results of this exercise — index funds add approximately $30,000/month in diversification benefits. In this case the estimate is not statistically different from zero, most likely because the sample size is considerably smaller than the set of active funds. Note that when value added is computed using gross returns (third column of the table), the estimates are negative, indicating that Vanguard funds are more efficient at providing diversification benefits than the average index fund. This inefficiency is also reflected in the funds’ net alphas — investors in Vanguard funds get the diversification benefits more cheaply than investors in other index funds.

The set of funds that we included in our study is considerably larger than the set previously studied in the literature. To a very large extent this difference derives from the fact that we do not exclude funds that invest internationally. One may therefore wonder to what extent the ability to invest in international stocks affects our value added numbers. We explore this question in Table 7 by forming subsamples of active and index funds based on their average portfolio weight in international stocks. We find that active funds that invested more in international stocks added more value. Indeed, funds that restricted themselves to only investing in U.S. stocks (on average, less than 10% in non-U.S. stocks) added no value.

One worry is that our Vanguard benchmark funds do not appropriately define the alternative investment opportunity set for international stocks, even though we include all the international index funds that Vanguard offers. If this explanation is right, it implies that index funds that invest more internationally will add more value. Table 7 shows that this is not the case. We find that index funds that invested more in international stocks added less value. Therefore, the ex post selection of active funds that have invested more or less in international funds appears to be correlated with skill. By excluding mutual funds that invest in international stocks, researchers...
Table 9: Performance of Active Funds and Index Funds: The table computes value-added numbers as well as net alpha numbers for our set of active mutual funds, and compares it to the performance of index funds. To separate the value added coming from diversification benefits vs stock picking/market timing, we use two different benchmarks: (1) Vanguard index funds net returns and (2) Vanguard index funds gross returns. To compute value-added numbers we use funds’ gross returns (including fees), and to compute net alpha numbers we use funds’ net returns.

may have unknowingly introduced a (potentially severe) selection bias.

8 Conclusion

In this paper we provide evidence of the existence of rents that can be attributable to managerial skill. We show that the average mutual fund manager uses his skills to generate value — about $2 million/year. This value added cannot easily be attributable to luck alone because it is persistent. Managers sorted on this measure of skill continue to add value, in some cases for as long as 10 years into the future.

Perhaps our most surprising result is that investors appear to be able to identify and correctly reward this skill. Not only do better managers earn higher compensation, but compensation
### Table 10: Fraction in International Funds and the Performance of Active Funds vs Index Funds

The table computes value-added numbers for funds with varying degrees of international stock exposure. We compute the numbers for active as well as passive funds. We use two different benchmarks: (1) Vanguard index funds net returns and (2) Vanguard index funds gross returns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frac. int.</th>
<th>No of funds</th>
<th>Vanguard BM Net</th>
<th>Vanguard BM Gross</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean VA</td>
<td>Mean VA TW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3740</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;30</td>
<td>4617</td>
<td>0.055</td>
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<td>&lt;50</td>
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<td>&lt;70</td>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;90</td>
<td>5236</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.266</td>
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<tr>
<td>≤ 100</td>
<td>5974</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.269</td>
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</table>

itself is a better predictor of future value added than past value added. Furthermore, the way investors reward managers is not consistent with a superstar effect — higher skilled managers do not earn disproportionately more compensation.

Our results seem consistent with the main predictions of Berk and Green (2004). Investors appear to be able to identify skilled managers and correctly determine their compensation through the flow–performance relation. However, that model also assumes that because rational investors compete in capital markets, the net alpha to investors is zero, that is, managers are able to capture all economic rents themselves. Instead we find that the net alpha of the average mutual fund investor is negative, indicating the presence of at least some sub-optimality on the part of investors. Why some investors appear to be satisfied earning below market returns, that is, why they commit too much capital to active management, is an open question worthy of future investigation.
Appendix

A   Benchmarks Funds with Unequal Lives

In this appendix we explain how we construct our set of benchmarks. We show how to evaluate a fund relative to two benchmarks that exist over different periods of time. The general case with $N$ benchmark funds is a straightforward generalization and is left to the reader.

Let $R_{g_i}^i$ denote the gross excess return of active fund $i$ at time $t$, which is stacked in the vector $R_i^g$:

$$R_i^g = \begin{bmatrix} R_{g_1}^i \\ \vdots \\ R_{g_T}^i \end{bmatrix}$$

and let $R_{B_1}^B$ denote the return on the first benchmark fund and $R_{B_2}^B$ the return on the second benchmark fund, which, over the time period in which they both exist, form the matrix $R_t^B$:

$$R_t^B = \begin{bmatrix} R_{B_1}^B \\ R_{B_2}^B \end{bmatrix}.$$ 

Assume that the first benchmark fund is available to investors over the whole sample period, while the second benchmark fund is only available over a subset of the sample, say the second half.

Let $\beta$ denote the projection coefficient of $R_{g_i}^i$ on the first benchmark fund’s return, $R_{B_1}^B$, and let

$$\gamma = \begin{bmatrix} \gamma_1 \\ \gamma_2 \end{bmatrix}.$$ 

denote the projection coefficients of $R_{g_i}^i$ on both benchmark funds, $R_{B_1}^B$ and $R_{B_2}^B$. Thus, during the time period when only the first benchmark exists, the value added of the fund at time $t$ is:

$$V_{it} = q_{i,t-1} \left( R_{g_i}^i - \beta R_{B_1}^B \right). \quad (18)$$

When both benchmark funds are offered, the value-added in period $t$ is:

$$V_{it} = q_{i,t-1} \left( R_{g_i}^i - R_t^B \gamma \right). \quad (19)$$

Let there be $T$ time periods and suppose that the second benchmark fund starts in period $S + 1$. 

31
The matrix of benchmark return observations is given by:

\[
X = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & R_{11} & \cdot & \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \\
1 & R_{1S} & \cdot & \\
1 & R_{1,S+1} & R_{2,S+1} & \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \\
1 & R_{1T} & R_{2T} & \\
\end{bmatrix}
\]

where \( \cdot \) indicates a missing value. Let \( X^O \) denote the following orthogonal matrix:

\[
X^O = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & R_{11} & \bar{R}_{2}^{BO} & \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \\
1 & R_{1S} & \bar{R}_{2}^{BO} & \\
1 & R_{1,S+1} & R_{2,S+1}^{BO} & \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \\
1 & R_{1T} & R_{2,T}^{BO} & \\
\end{bmatrix}
\]

where:

\[
\bar{R}_{2}^{BO} = \frac{\sum_{t=S+1}^{T} R_{2t}^{BO}}{T - S}.
\]

and where \( R_{2,S+1}^{BO}, \ldots, R_{2,T}^{BO} \) are obtained by projecting \( R_{2t}^{B} \) onto \( R_{1t}^{B} \):

\[
R_{2t}^{BO} = R_{2t}^{B} - \theta R_{1t}^{B} \quad \text{for } t = S + 1, \ldots, T
\]

where,

\[
\theta = \frac{cov(R_{2t}^{B}, R_{1t}^{B})}{var(R_{1t}^{B})}.
\]

Finally, define:

\[
\hat{X}^O = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & R_{11} & 0 & \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \\
1 & R_{1S} & 0 & \\
1 & R_{1,S+1} & R_{2,S+1}^{BO} & \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \\
1 & R_{1T} & R_{2,T}^{BO} & \\
\end{bmatrix}
\]
Proposition 1. The value-added of the firm at any time $t$ can be estimated as follows:

$$ V_{it} = q_{i,t-1} \left( R_{it}^g - \zeta_2 \hat{X}_{2t}^O - \zeta_3 \hat{X}_{3t}^O \right) $$

(20)

using a single OLS regression to estimate $\zeta$:

$$ \zeta = \left( X'^O X^O \right)^{-1} X'^O R_{it}^g. $$

Proof: The second and the third column of $X^O$ are orthogonal to each other, both over the full sample as well as over the two subsamples. Because of this orthogonality and $X_{2t}^O = R_{1t}^B$, the regression coefficient $\zeta_2$ is given by:

$$ \zeta_2 = \frac{\text{cov}(R_{it}^g, R_{1t}^B)}{\text{var}(R_{1t}^B)} = \beta. $$

So for any $t \leq S$, (20) reduces to (18) and so this estimate of value added is consistent over the first subsample. Using the orthogonality of $X^O$,

$$ \zeta_3 = \frac{\text{cov}(R_{it}^g, X_{3t}^O)}{\text{var}(X_{3t}^O)} = \frac{\text{cov}(R_{it}^g, R_{2t}^{BO})}{\text{var}(R_{2t}^{BO})}, $$

rewriting

$$ \gamma_1 R_{1t}^B + \gamma_2 R_{2t}^B = \gamma_1 R_{1t}^B + \gamma_2 (\theta R_{1t}^B + R_{2t}^{BO}) = (\gamma_1 + \theta \gamma_2) R_{1t}^B + \gamma_2 R_{2t}^{BO} $$

and using the fact that linear projections are unique implies

$$ \zeta_2 = \beta = \gamma_1 + \theta \gamma_2 $$

and

$$ \zeta_3 = \gamma_2. $$

So for $t > S$,

$$ V_{it} = q_{i,t-1} \left( R_{it}^g - \zeta_2 \hat{X}_{2t}^O - \zeta_3 \hat{X}_{3t}^O \right) $$

$$ = q_{i,t-1} \left( R_{it}^g - (\gamma_1 + \theta \gamma_2) R_{1t}^B - \gamma_2 R_{2t}^{BO} \right) $$

$$ = q_{i,t-1} \left( R_{it}^g - \gamma_1 R_{1t}^B - \gamma_2 R_{2t}^B \right) $$

which is (19) and so the estimate is also consistent over the second subsample.
B Robustness

Table 11 reports the results of conducting our study within different subsamples of our data. We select the samples based on the time period and whether managers invest internationally.

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<tr>
<td>In Sample VA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.14**</td>
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<td>0.42**</td>
<td>0.29**</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
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<td>In Sample Net Alpha</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-7*</td>
<td>-5*</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Weighted (b.p./mon)</td>
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<td>-7*</td>
<td>-5*</td>
<td>-5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time Value Weighted (b.p./mon)</td>
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<td>-3**</td>
<td>-5**</td>
<td>-9**</td>
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<td>Panel B: FCC Risk Adjustment</td>
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<td>In Sample VA</td>
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<td>0.15**</td>
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<td>Equally Weighted (b.p./mon)</td>
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<td>-9*</td>
<td>-8*</td>
<td>-7**</td>
</tr>
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<td>Value Weighted (b.p./mon)</td>
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<td>-7*</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-8**</td>
</tr>
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<td>Time Value Weighted (b.p./mon)</td>
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<td>-4**</td>
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<td>Total Number of Funds</td>
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<td>5943</td>
<td>2811</td>
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Table 11: Subsample Analysis: * – \( t \)-statistic greater (in absolute value) than 1.96. **– \( t \)-statistic greater (in absolute value) than 2.54.
References


Shumway, T., M. B. Szefler, and K. Yuan (2009): “The Information Content of Revealed Beliefs in Portfolio Holdings,”.
